{"id":16935,"date":"2015-11-01T15:02:33","date_gmt":"2015-11-01T12:02:33","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/109.232.216.219\/~bilimvegelecek\/?p=16935"},"modified":"2018-01-17T15:37:49","modified_gmt":"2018-01-17T12:37:49","slug":"kriz-finansallasma-ve-cokus","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/bilimvegelecek.com.tr\/index.php\/2015\/11\/01\/kriz-finansallasma-ve-cokus","title":{"rendered":"Kriz, finansalla\u015fma ve \u2018\u00e7\u00f6k\u00fc\u015f\u2019"},"content":{"rendered":"

7 sene \u00f6nce, 15 Eyl\u00fcl 2008\u2019de ABD yat\u0131r\u0131m bankas\u0131 Lehman Brothers\u2019\u0131n \u00e7\u00f6k\u00fc\u015f\u00fc k\u00fcresel krizin fitilini ate\u015fleyen bir \u201colay\u201d olmu\u015ftu. O tarihten bug\u00fcne kriz co\u011frafi yay\u0131lmas\u0131n\u0131 tamamlamakla beraber, durulmak \u015f\u00f6yle dursun derinle\u015fmeye ba\u015flad\u0131. 7 y\u0131l \u00f6nce patlak veren k\u00fcresel krizin derinle\u015fmi\u015f bir evresinden ge\u00e7iyoruz bug\u00fcn. Hem ya\u015fad\u0131\u011f\u0131m\u0131z d\u00fcnyay\u0131 anlaman\u0131n hem de buna g\u00f6re bir siyaset \u00fcretmenin yolu, hi\u00e7 ku\u015fku yok ki, ekonomiyi ve bir b\u00fct\u00fcn olarak hayat\u0131 anlamaktan ge\u00e7iyor.<\/em><\/p>\n

Yedi sene \u00f6nce, 15 Eyl\u00fcl 2008\u2019de ABD yat\u0131r\u0131m bankas\u0131 Lehman Brothers\u2019\u0131n \u00e7\u00f6k\u00fc\u015f\u00fc k\u00fcresel krizin fitilini ate\u015fleyen bir \u201colay\u201d olmu\u015ftu. O tarihten bug\u00fcne kriz co\u011frafi yay\u0131lmas\u0131n\u0131 tamamlamakla beraber, durulmak \u015f\u00f6yle dursun derinle\u015fmeye ba\u015flad\u0131. Bu derinle\u015fmeyi belki de en iyi okuyabilece\u011fimiz \u201cmoment\u201d 24 A\u011fustos 2015\u2019tir. Tarihe \u201ckara pazartesi\u201d olarak ge\u00e7en bu g\u00fcnde s\u0131ras\u0131yla \u015fu \u201colaylar\u201d ya\u015fand\u0131: ABD borsalar\u0131 Nasdaq ve Dow Jones g\u00f6r\u00fclmemi\u015f kay\u0131plar ya\u015fad\u0131. O g\u00fcn Nasdaq endeksi y\u00fczde 8\u2019e yak\u0131n bir de\u011fer kayb\u0131yla g\u00fcne ba\u015flad\u0131; Dow Jones ise y\u00fczde 4,82 yani 1000 puanl\u0131k bir d\u00fc\u015f\u00fc\u015f ya\u015fad\u0131. Benzer \u015fekilde S&P 500 de y\u00fczde 4,45 de\u011fer kaybetti. Londra\u2019n\u0131n FTSE 100 endeksi yakla\u015f\u0131k 74 milyar sterlinlik bir de\u011fer kayb\u0131 ya\u015fad\u0131. Almanya\u2019daki DAX endeksi y\u00fczde 3 geriledi. Bir b\u00fct\u00fcn olarak Avrupa\u2019da 400 milyar euro\u2019luk bir erimenin ya\u015fand\u0131\u011f\u0131 s\u00f6yleniyor (H\u00fcrriyet<\/em>, 24 A\u011fustos 2015). Tabii \u201ck\u00fcresel piyasalar\u201ddaki bu \u00e7alkant\u0131n\u0131n tetikleyicisi \u00c7in\u2019di. \u00c7in\u2019den gelen \u201ck\u00f6t\u00fc haberler\u201din etkisi d\u00fcnya piyasalar\u0131na bir \u201ckara pazartesi\u201d ya\u015fatt\u0131. 24 A\u011fustos\u2019ta Asya borsalar\u0131nda y\u00fczde 5\u2019i a\u015fk\u0131n kay\u0131plar ya\u015fand\u0131; \u015eanghay borsas\u0131 y\u00fczde 8,5 kay\u0131p ya\u015fad\u0131 (hemen ertesi g\u00fcnk\u00fc kay\u0131p ise y\u00fczde 6\u2019yd\u0131); \u00c7in\u2019de CSI300 endeksi g\u00fcn\u00fc y\u00fczde 8,6\u2019l\u0131k bir d\u00fc\u015f\u00fc\u015fle kapatt\u0131. Japonya\u2019n\u0131n g\u00f6sterge endekslerinden Nikkei ise y\u00fczde 4,6\u2019l\u0131k bir kay\u0131p ya\u015fad\u0131. \u015eekil 1, durumun vahametini anlatmaya yetecektir.[1]<\/a><\/p>\n

\"\"25 A\u011fustos g\u00fcn\u00fc The<\/em> Daily Telegraph<\/em>\u2019\u0131n att\u0131\u011f\u0131 ba\u015fl\u0131k \u015f\u00f6yleydi: \u201cKara Pazartesi yeni bir finansal kriz riski olu\u015fturuyor.\u201d<\/p>\n

Ekonomiyi canland\u0131rma amac\u0131yla \u00c7inli yetkililerin yakla\u015f\u0131k 200 milyar dolarl\u0131k bir harcamada bulunmalar\u0131 bile krizi \u00f6nlemek i\u00e7in yetersiz kalm\u0131\u015ft\u0131 (Aljazeera<\/em>, 30 A\u011fustos 2015).<\/p>\n

24 A\u011fustos\u2019ta Forbes<\/em>\u2019ta Frances Coppola imzas\u0131yla yay\u0131nlanan bir yaz\u0131n\u0131n ba\u015fl\u0131\u011f\u0131na bakal\u0131m \u015fimdi de: \u201c\u00c7in\u2019in Kara Pazartesi\u2019si \u00fclke ekonomisinin b\u00fcy\u00fcme d\u00f6ng\u00fcs\u00fcn\u00fcn sonuna gelindi\u011finin sinyallerini veriyor.\u201d 25 A\u011fustos Sal\u0131 g\u00fcn\u00fc The Guardian<\/em>\u2019da Larry Elliott imzal\u0131 yaz\u0131n\u0131n ba\u015fl\u0131\u011f\u0131 ise tam olarak \u015f\u00f6yle: \u201c\u00c7in\u2019in Kara Pazartesi\u2019si \u015fa\u015f\u0131rt\u0131c\u0131 bir \u015fekilde Wall Street\u2019in 1929 y\u0131l\u0131ndaki \u00e7\u00f6k\u00fc\u015f\u00fcne benziyor.\u201d<\/p>\n

Peki, \u00c7in\u2019in \u201cdengesini kaybetmesi\u201d ne anlama gelmektedir, diye sorulabilir. Bunu da Korkut Boratav\u2019dan dinleyelim: \u201cBu dev ekonominin [yani \u00c7in\u2019in] t\u00f6kezlemesi elbette t\u00fcm d\u00fcnyay\u0131 etkileyecektir; ama \u00f6ncelikle petrol d\u00e2hil, hammadde ihracat\u00e7\u0131lar\u0131n\u0131\u2026 Petrol ve t\u00fcm hammadde fiyatlar\u0131nda ba\u015flayan d\u00fc\u015fmenin katk\u0131s\u0131yla 2015\u2019te k\u00fc\u00e7\u00fclmeye ba\u015flayan iki b\u00fcy\u00fck ekonominin Rusya ve Brezilya olmas\u0131 rastlant\u0131 de\u011fildir\u201d (Sendika1.Org<\/em>, 28 A\u011fustos 2015). Tabii \u00c7in ekonomisinin b\u00fcy\u00fcmesinde g\u00f6r\u00fclen bu durgunluk d\u00fcnyadaki genel durgunlukla ele al\u0131nmay\u0131 hak ediyor, zira \u00c7in\u2019deki yava\u015flama \u201cgenel\u201din \u201c\u00f6zel\u201ddeki yans\u0131mas\u0131ndan ibaret. E. Ahmet Tonak\u2019\u0131n da alt\u0131n\u0131 \u00e7izdi\u011fi gibi, \u201c\u00c7in\u2019deki b\u00fcy\u00fcmenin duraksamas\u0131n\u0131n nedeni \u2026 d\u00fcnya ekonomisinin duraksamas\u0131d\u0131r\u201d (Sendika1.Org<\/em>, 26 A\u011fustos 2015). Bu ise bize 2008 k\u00fcresel krizinin derinle\u015ferek devam etti\u011fini g\u00f6stermektedir. Bu ba\u011flamda iktisat\u00e7\u0131 \u00dcmit Ak\u00e7ay \u015funlar\u0131 s\u00f6ylerken asl\u0131nda temel bir ger\u00e7ekli\u011fi ifade etmi\u015f oluyor:<\/p>\n

\u201cK\u00fcresel ekonomik krizin 2008\u2019den itibaren seyrini d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcnd\u00fc\u011f\u00fcm\u00fczde, krizin derinle\u015fme a\u015famas\u0131na ge\u00e7ti\u011fini g\u00f6r\u00fcyoruz. Bu anlamda \u00c7in i\u00e7in 2008 krizi yeni ba\u015fl\u0131yor diyebiliriz. Ancak \u00c7in\u2019in d\u00fcnya ekonomisi ile y\u00fcksek entegrasyon d\u00fczeyi, \u00c7in\u2019deki sorunlar\u0131n h\u0131zla di\u011fer \u00fclkelere sirayet edebilece\u011fini g\u00f6steriyor. Ger\u00e7ekten de \u00c7in\u2019deki tempo kayb\u0131, bir yandan d\u00fcnya ticaretinin daralmas\u0131na, di\u011fer yandan da emtia fiyatlar\u0131n\u0131n d\u00fc\u015fmesine neden oldu. Ayr\u0131ca, tempo kayb\u0131n\u0131n \u00f6n\u00fcne ge\u00e7mek i\u00e7in yap\u0131lan deval\u00fcasyonlar, ABD ve Avrupa\u2019ya deflasyon dalgalar\u0131 yollamaya devam edecek. K\u0131sacas\u0131, yak\u0131n gelecekte k\u00fcresel d\u00fczeyde ekonomik kriz riskinin ortadan kalkaca\u011f\u0131na dair herhangi bir kan\u0131t\u0131m\u0131z yok.\u201d[2]<\/a><\/p>\n

2013 y\u0131l\u0131nda yay\u0131nlanan \u00dc\u00e7\u00fcnc\u00fc B\u00fcy\u00fck Depresyon<\/em> isimli kitab\u0131nda Sungur Savran ba\u015fta \u00c7in olmak \u00fczere y\u00fcksek b\u00fcy\u00fcme yakalayan ekonomilerin varl\u0131\u011f\u0131 \u201cB\u00fcy\u00fck Depresyon\u2019un hakiki potansiyelini \u015fimdiye kadar g\u00f6stermesine engel olmu\u015ftur\u201d tespitinde bulunmaktad\u0131r.[3]<\/a> Hat\u0131rlan\u0131rsa, kapitalizmin ileri derecede geli\u015fmi\u015f oldu\u011fu \u00fclkeler 2008 krizini son derece a\u011f\u0131r bir bi\u00e7imde ya\u015fam\u0131\u015ft\u0131. Ama \u00c7in ba\u015fta olmak \u00fczere, Hindistan ve Brezilya gibi \u201cy\u00fckselen ekonomiler\u201d krizden \u00e7ok etkilenmemi\u015f, hatta y\u00fcksek oranlarda b\u00fcy\u00fcmeye devam etmi\u015fti. Savran\u2019a g\u00f6re, \u201c\u00c7in\u2019in h\u0131zl\u0131 b\u00fcy\u00fcmesinin yaratt\u0131\u011f\u0131 y\u00fcksek talep dolay\u0131s\u0131yla, bir\u00e7ok emtia \u00fcreticisi \u00fclke krizden etkilenmemektedir. Latin Amerika\u2019n\u0131n baz\u0131 \u00fclkeleri (\u015eili, Arjantin, Brezilya vb.) ve Avustralya gibi emtia \u00fcreticisi \u00fclkeler bu y\u00fczden \u00c7in\u2019inkine ba\u011fl\u0131 bir y\u00fcksek b\u00fcy\u00fcme temposunu s\u00fcrd\u00fcrmektedirler.\u201d[4]<\/a> \u015eu halde \u00c7in\u2019deki \u201ct\u00f6kezleme\u201dnin yak\u0131n gelecekte k\u00fcresel krizin ger\u00e7ek potansiyellerini a\u011f\u0131r bir bi\u00e7imde g\u00f6sterece\u011fi \u00f6ng\u00f6r\u00fcs\u00fcnde bulunabiliriz.<\/p>\n

\"\"Belki \u015fu sorulabilir; \u00c7in\u2019deki borsa \u00e7\u00f6k\u00fc\u015f\u00fc olmasayd\u0131 k\u00fcresel krizden \u00e7\u0131k\u0131laca\u011f\u0131na dair bir olas\u0131l\u0131ktan s\u00f6z edilebilir miydi? Bu olas\u0131l\u0131\u011f\u0131n do\u011fru olmad\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 kan\u0131tlamak i\u00e7in sadece i\u015fsizlik, istihdam ve b\u00fcy\u00fcme rakamlar\u0131na bakmak bile yeterli olacakt\u0131r. \u015eekil 2 d\u00fcnya geneli i\u00e7in b\u00fcy\u00fcme oranlar\u0131n\u0131 g\u00f6stermektedir.[5]<\/a><\/p>\n

Tablo a\u00e7\u0131k bir bi\u00e7imde 2010 y\u0131l\u0131 itibariyle d\u00fcnya b\u00fcy\u00fcme oran\u0131 4,3 gibi bir orandayken, takip eden y\u0131llarda b\u00fcy\u00fcmenin yava\u015flad\u0131\u011f\u0131 ve bu yava\u015flaman\u0131n da devam edece\u011fini g\u00f6stermektedir. Bu g\u00f6sterge bize, d\u00fcnyada h\u00e2l\u00e2 durgun bir b\u00fcy\u00fcme oldu\u011funun \u00e7arp\u0131c\u0131 bir kan\u0131t\u0131n\u0131 verir.<\/p>\n

\"\"Bir ba\u015fka g\u00f6sterge ise \u201cy\u00fckselen ekonomiler\u201de ait. \u015eekil 3 gerek \u00c7in gerekse de \u00c7in d\u0131\u015f\u0131nda kalan \u00fclkeler i\u00e7in 2010 y\u0131l\u0131ndan itibaren b\u00fcy\u00fcmenin ciddi bir d\u00fc\u015f\u00fc\u015f trendine girmi\u015f oldu\u011funu g\u00f6stermektedir.[6]<\/a><\/p>\n

B\u00fcy\u00fcmeye dair sadece bu iki veri bile d\u00fcnya ekonomisinin gelece\u011fine dair bize bir fikir veriyor. Peki, i\u015fsizlik rakamlar\u0131 nas\u0131l? Bu konuda da elde \u201ci\u00e7 a\u00e7\u0131c\u0131\u201d rakamlar\u0131n oldu\u011funu s\u00f6ylemek hayli zor g\u00f6r\u00fcn\u00fcyor. \u00d6rne\u011fin ILO verilerine g\u00f6re 2013 y\u0131l\u0131nda d\u00fcnya genelindeki i\u015fsiz say\u0131s\u0131 yakla\u015f\u0131k 202 milyondur. \u201cE\u011fer e\u011filim bu y\u00f6nde devam edecek olursa, k\u00fcresel i\u015fsizlik daha da k\u00f6t\u00fcle\u015fecektir. 2018 y\u0131l\u0131na kadar bu say\u0131 215 milyonu a\u015fm\u0131\u015f olacakt\u0131r.\u201d[7]<\/a> \u015eekil 4\u2019teki grafik belli ba\u015fl\u0131 ekonomilerdeki toplam i\u015fsiz n\u00fcfus i\u00e7erisinde yer alan uzun vadeli i\u015fsizlik oranlar\u0131n\u0131 g\u00f6stermektedir.[8]<\/a><\/p>\n

\"\"A\u00e7\u0131k bir \u015fekilde g\u00f6r\u00fcld\u00fc\u011f\u00fc gibi Kanada, Avustralya, Amerika, Arjantin, \u0130ngiltere, Fransa, Japonya, \u0130spanya, \u0130talya ve G\u00fcney Afrika gibi \u00fclkelerde 2007 y\u0131l\u0131na, yani kriz \u00f6ncesi y\u0131la k\u0131yasla i\u015fsizlik oranlar\u0131nda muazzam bir art\u0131\u015f ya\u015fanm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r.<\/p>\n

Gen\u00e7ler aras\u0131ndaki i\u015fsizlik oranlar\u0131na bak\u0131ld\u0131\u011f\u0131nda durum daha da k\u00f6t\u00fcd\u00fcr. \u015eekil 5\u2019teki grafik Haziran 2015 tarihine ait gen\u00e7 i\u015fsizli\u011fine dair rakamlar\u0131 g\u00f6stermektedir.[9]<\/a><\/p>\n

\"\"G\u00f6r\u00fcld\u00fc\u011f\u00fc gibi Yunanistan, \u0130spanya, \u0130talya, H\u0131rvatistan, K\u0131br\u0131s ve Portekiz gibi \u00fclkelerde gen\u00e7ler aras\u0131nda muazzam bir i\u015fsizlik g\u00f6ze \u00e7arpmaktad\u0131r.<\/p>\n

Marx, Kapital<\/em>\u2019de \u201cKapitalist \u00fcretim (\u2026) rahat bir bi\u00e7imde faaliyet g\u00f6sterebilmek i\u00e7in (\u2026) bir yedek [i\u015fg\u00fcc\u00fc] ordusunun varl\u0131\u011f\u0131na ihtiya\u00e7 duyar,\u201d[10]<\/a> der; yukar\u0131da g\u00f6sterdi\u011fimiz rakamlar bu tespitinin olsa olsa g\u00fcncellenmesi anlam\u0131na gelir!<\/p>\n

Bu uzun giri\u015ften sonra \u015fimdi as\u0131l konumuza gelebiliriz. Finansalla\u015fma konusunu ele alaca\u011f\u0131m\u0131z bu yaz\u0131da, sermaye formlar\u0131 aras\u0131ndaki d\u00f6nemsel farkl\u0131l\u0131klara k\u0131saca de\u011finip ge\u00e7tikten sonra daha \u00e7ok 1970\u2019lerden sonraki s\u00fcre\u00e7te, para-sermayenin \u00f6ne \u00e7\u0131km\u0131\u015f olmas\u0131n\u0131n nedenleri ve sonu\u00e7lar\u0131 \u00fczerinde duraca\u011f\u0131z. Sonras\u0131nda finansalla\u015fma s\u00fcrecinde \u201cfinansal ara\u00e7lar\u201d\u0131n sistemin hareketi a\u00e7\u0131s\u0131ndan nas\u0131l bir i\u015flev g\u00f6rd\u00fc\u011f\u00fcne de\u011finecek ve sistemin finans y\u00f6n\u00fcn\u00fcn g\u00fcn\u00fcm\u00fczde, daha \u00f6nceki d\u00f6nemlere k\u0131yasla hi\u00e7 olmad\u0131\u011f\u0131 kadar \u00f6n plana \u00e7\u0131km\u0131\u015f olmas\u0131n\u0131n sistemin \u201ck\u0131r\u0131lganl\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131\u201d ne \u00f6l\u00e7\u00fcde art\u0131rd\u0131\u011f\u0131na bak\u0131p, bu durumun 2007-8 krizinin zeminini nas\u0131l d\u00f6\u015fedi\u011fini ara\u015ft\u0131rmaya \u00e7al\u0131\u015faca\u011f\u0131z. Ama t\u00fcm bunlar\u0131n \u00f6ncesinde, giri\u015f niteli\u011finde olmas\u0131 a\u00e7\u0131s\u0131ndan, en genel d\u00fczeyde sermayenin devresel hareketi, sermaye birikimi, sermayenin yo\u011funla\u015fmas\u0131 ve merkez\u00eele\u015fmesi, tekelle\u015fme ve emperyalizm gibi temel konular\u0131, teorik bir \u00e7er\u00e7eve sa\u011flamas\u0131 a\u00e7\u0131s\u0131ndan sergiledikten sonra finansalla\u015fma konusuna, \u00f6zel olarak da konunun krizle olan boyutuna yo\u011funla\u015fmay\u0131 d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcn\u00fcyoruz. Bu \u015fekilde, bug\u00fcn h\u00e2l\u00e2 etkilerini hissetti\u011fimiz 2007-8 k\u00fcresel krizinin anla\u015f\u0131lmas\u0131 i\u00e7in genel bir \u00e7er\u00e7eve \u00e7izmi\u015f olaca\u011f\u0131z.<\/p>\n

Sermayenin devresel hareketi <\/strong><\/p>\n

Ya\u015fam s\u00fcreci i\u00e7erisinde sermaye \u00fc\u00e7 forma b\u00fcr\u00fcn\u00fcr; bunlar para-sermaye, meta-sermaye ve \u00fcretken-sermayedir. Sermayenin bu \u00fc\u00e7 temel formunun tarihsel hareketinde, farkl\u0131 sermaye formlar\u0131 ve bunlar\u0131n devrelerinin bask\u0131nl\u0131\u011f\u0131 o tarihsel d\u00f6neme rengini verir. \u00d6rne\u011fin Marx\u2019\u0131n ya\u015fad\u0131\u011f\u0131 19. y\u00fczy\u0131l, meta-sermayenin ve bu sermaye formunun uluslararas\u0131la\u015fmas\u0131yla karakterize olur. 1873-96 bunal\u0131m\u0131ndan sonra, sermaye ihrac\u0131n\u0131n h\u0131zlanmas\u0131yla birlikte, para-sermayenin uluslararas\u0131la\u015fmas\u0131 ya\u015fanm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r ve bu da daha \u00e7ok devletler aras\u0131 bor\u00e7 ve kredi ili\u015fkileri bi\u00e7imde ger\u00e7ekle\u015fmi\u015ftir. \u0130kinci D\u00fcnya Sava\u015f\u0131 sonras\u0131ndaki d\u00f6nemde ise \u00fcretken-sermayenin uluslararas\u0131la\u015fmas\u0131 \u00f6n plana \u00e7\u0131km\u0131\u015f ve nihayetinde 1970\u2019lerin ortalar\u0131nda ya\u015fanan buhran ve sonras\u0131ndaki d\u00f6nemde ise para-sermayenin hareketi d\u00f6nemi karakterize eden h\u00e2kim unsur olmu\u015ftur (\u00d6zt\u00fcrk, 2006: 273-74). Elbette sermayenin her \u00fc\u00e7 formunun bu sayd\u0131\u011f\u0131m\u0131z d\u00f6nemler i\u00e7erisinde birbirlerini tamamlayan hat\u0131r\u0131 say\u0131l\u0131r a\u011f\u0131rl\u0131klar\u0131 olsa da, kapitalizmin tarihsel seyri i\u00e7erisinde bu sermaye formlar\u0131ndan biri \u00f6ne \u00e7\u0131karak d\u00f6neme h\u00e2kim rengini vermi\u015ftir.<\/p>\n

Bu tarihsel arka plan\u0131 bir kenara b\u0131rak\u0131p, bu her \u00fc\u00e7 formu da en genel soyutlukta sermayenin devresel hareketi i\u00e7erisinde g\u00f6rmeye \u00e7al\u0131\u015fal\u0131m.<\/p>\n

En genel d\u00fczeyde hareket \u015fu \u015fekilde cereyan eder: Kapitalist elindeki parayla (para-sermaye) s\u00fcrece ba\u015flar. Bu paraya biz k\u0131saca P diyelim. Kapitalist elindeki bu parayla \u00fcretim ara\u00e7lar\u0131 (\u00dcA) ve emek g\u00fcc\u00fc (EG) sat\u0131n al\u0131r. Bu iki meta t\u00fcr\u00fcne k\u0131saca M diyelim. Bu \u015fekilde kapitalistin elindeki para-sermaye metalara (M) d\u00f6n\u00fc\u015ft\u00fcr\u00fcl\u00fcr. Bu ilk devre, \u00fcretim alan\u0131 d\u0131\u015f\u0131nda yani piyasada ger\u00e7ekle\u015fir. Sat\u0131n al\u0131nan bu metalar \u00fcretim yap\u0131lacak alanda bir araya getirilir. Kapitalist \u00fcretim, \u00fcretim s\u00fcreci ve de\u011ferlenme s\u00fcrecinin bir birlikteli\u011fidir. Buradaki as\u0131l ama\u00e7, \u00fcretim yapmak de\u011fil<\/strong>; kapitalist i\u00e7in \u201ckatlan\u0131lmas\u0131 gereken zorunlu bir s\u00fcre\u00e7\u201d vas\u0131tas\u0131yla -yani \u00fcretim vas\u0131tas\u0131yla- art\u0131k de\u011fer \u00fcretmektir.<\/p>\n

\u00dcA ve EG\u2019nin bir araya getirildi\u011fi devre \u00fcretken sermaye devresidir ve s\u00fcre\u00e7 meta-sermayenin (M\u2019) \u00fcretilmesi ile sonlan\u0131r. Ortaya \u00e7\u0131kan meta-sermaye (M\u2019) \u00fcretim s\u00fcreci ve de\u011ferlenme s\u00fcrecinin birlikteli\u011finin nesnelle\u015fmi\u015f bir \u201c\u00e7\u0131kt\u0131\u201ds\u0131, emek g\u00fcc\u00fc ve emek ara\u00e7lar\u0131n\u0131n kristalize olmu\u015f bir \u201c\u00fcr\u00fcn\u201d\u00fcd\u00fcr. Meta-sermaye (M\u2019) sat\u0131l\u0131p i\u00e7indeki art\u0131k de\u011fer realize olduktan sonra da kapitalistin ba\u015flang\u0131\u00e7ta yat\u0131rd\u0131\u011f\u0131 para-sermaye olan P kar\u015f\u0131m\u0131za P\u2019 olarak \u00e7\u0131kar. Biraz daha somutla\u015ft\u0131rarak anlatmaya \u00e7al\u0131\u015fal\u0131m:<\/p>\n

Kapitalistimiz EG ve \u00dcA i\u00e7in ba\u015flang\u0131\u00e7ta her birine 10\u2019ar lira olmak \u00fczere toplamda 20 lira yat\u0131rm\u0131\u015f olsun (hesaplamas\u0131 kolay olsun diye say\u0131lar\u0131 k\u00fc\u00e7\u00fck se\u00e7iyoruz). Yat\u0131r\u0131lan bu 20 liral\u0131k sermayenin ad\u0131na \u00f6ndelenmi\u015f sermaye denir; ya da kolay olsun diye buna \u201cyat\u0131r\u0131lan sermaye\u201d de diyebiliriz. Emek s\u00fcreci i\u00e7erisinde fazladan +10\u2019luk bir de\u011fer yarat\u0131lm\u0131\u015f olsun (burada s\u00f6m\u00fcr\u00fc oran\u0131n\u0131 % 100 kabul ediyoruz). Dolay\u0131s\u0131yla emek s\u00fcrecinin sonunda elde edilen meta-sermayenin (M\u2019) de\u011feri 20+10=30 olur. Bu soyutlama d\u00fczeyinde +10\u2019luk fazlan\u0131n nas\u0131l olu\u015ftu\u011fu \u00fczerinde fazla durmayaca\u011f\u0131z; ama ge\u00e7erken belirtelim, bu +10\u2019luk fazlal\u0131k, kar\u015f\u0131l\u0131\u011f\u0131 \u00f6denmemi\u015f emek-zaman olarak kapitalistin i\u015f\u00e7iden \u00e7ekip ald\u0131\u011f\u0131 fazlal\u0131kt\u0131r. Emek s\u00fcrecinin sonunda a\u00e7\u0131\u011fa \u00e7\u0131kan 30 lira de\u011ferindeki meta-sermaye (M\u2019) sat\u0131l\u0131p, i\u00e7indeki art\u0131k de\u011fer realize oldu\u011funda bu +10\u2019luk fazlal\u0131k k\u00e2r olarak kapitalistin cebine girer\u2026 Hat\u0131rlan\u0131rsa P=20 olarak s\u00fcrece ba\u015flanm\u0131\u015ft\u0131 ve \u015fu anki P\u2019=30 olarak kar\u015f\u0131m\u0131za \u00e7\u0131k\u0131yor. Form\u00fcle etti\u011fimizde, art\u0131k de\u011feri ya da onun k\u00e2r bi\u00e7imini \u015fu \u015fekilde de ifade edebiliriz: P\u2019\u2013P=DP. Bu form\u00fclde DP, +10\u2019luk fazlal\u0131\u011f\u0131 temsil eden k\u00e2rd\u0131r.<\/p>\n

Bu a\u015famada kapitalistin yapaca\u011f\u0131 iki \u015fey vard\u0131r; DP \u015feklinde form\u00fcle etti\u011fimiz art\u0131k de\u011feri ya oldu\u011fu gibi t\u00fcketecek ya da bu DP\u2019nin bir k\u0131sm\u0131n\u0131 yeniden sermayelendirecek. \u0130lk duruma basit yeniden \u00fcretim, ikinci duruma ise geni\u015fletilmi\u015f yeniden \u00fcretim denildi\u011fini biliyoruz. Rekabetin her bir kapitaliste dayatt\u0131\u011f\u0131 zorunluluk, kapitalistleri geni\u015fletilmi\u015f yeniden \u00fcretime zorlar. Bunu yapmad\u0131\u011f\u0131nda kapitalistin ayakta kalmas\u0131 \u00e7ok zordur. Marx Kapital<\/em>\u2019de \u015f\u00f6yle der:<\/p>\n

\u201c[K]apitalist \u00fcretimin geli\u015fmesiyle birlikte bir sanayi giri\u015fimine yat\u0131r\u0131lm\u0131\u015f bulunan sermayenin kendisini durmadan b\u00fcy\u00fctmesi bir zorunluluk haline gelir ve rekabetin zoru ile tek tek b\u00fct\u00fcn kapitalistler, kapitalist \u00fcretim tarz\u0131n\u0131n kendi \u00f6z\u00fcnden do\u011fan yasalara, d\u0131\u015far\u0131dan gelme zorlay\u0131c\u0131 yasalar olarak boyun e\u011fmek mecburiyetinde kal\u0131r. Bunlar, kapitalisti, varl\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 devam ettirebilmesi i\u00e7in, sermayesini durmadan art\u0131rmak zorunda b\u0131rak\u0131r; kapitalist de bunu ancak gittik\u00e7e artan birikimle sa\u011flayabilir.\u201d (2011: 572-73)<\/p>\n

\u015eimdi b\u0131rakt\u0131\u011f\u0131m\u0131z yere geri d\u00f6nelim: Elimizdeki 10 liral\u0131k DP kapitalist taraf\u0131ndan iki bi\u00e7imde kullan\u0131lm\u0131\u015f olsun; biri kapitalistin kendisi ve ailesi i\u00e7in, di\u011feri de yeniden sermayelendirme i\u00e7in. 10 liral\u0131k k\u00e2r\u0131n 4 liras\u0131 kapitalistin nihai t\u00fcketimine gitsin; 6 liras\u0131 da 3 liras\u0131 ek \u00fcretim arac\u0131, 3 liras\u0131 ise ek emek g\u00fc\u00e7leri olmak \u00fczere harcans\u0131n. \u015eu halde sermaye devresinin ikinci s\u00fcreci \u015f\u00f6yle ba\u015flayacakt\u0131r: Yeni P=26 lirad\u0131r. Bu 26 lira, her birine 13\u2019er lira d\u00fc\u015fecek \u015fekilde \u00fcretim arac\u0131 (\u00dcA) ve emek g\u00fcc\u00fc (EG) olarak ikiye b\u00f6l\u00fcns\u00fcn. S\u00f6m\u00fcr\u00fc oran\u0131n\u0131n % 100 oldu\u011funu veri ald\u0131\u011f\u0131m\u0131zda 26 lira ile ba\u015flayan s\u00fcre\u00e7 39 liral\u0131k bir meta-sermayede nesnelle\u015fmi\u015f olacakt\u0131r. Yeni meta-sermaye sat\u0131ld\u0131\u011f\u0131nda elde edilecek yeni k\u00e2r \u015fimdi 13 lirad\u0131r. \u0130lk devredeki 10 liral\u0131k k\u00e2r\u0131n, bu ikinci s\u00fcre\u00e7te 13 liraya y\u00fckseldi\u011fini; kapitalistin 10 liradan 13 liraya do\u011fru nicel bir b\u00fcy\u00fckl\u00fc\u011fe eri\u015fti\u011fini g\u00f6rm\u00fc\u015f bulunuyoruz. \u0130\u015fte buna sermaye birikimi denir.<\/p>\n

Kapital<\/em>\u2019in 2. cildinde Marx sermayenin ba\u015fkala\u015f\u0131mlar\u0131 ve bunlar\u0131n devrelerini uzun uzad\u0131ya anlat\u0131r ve temel olarak \u00fc\u00e7 devre sayar; para-sermaye devresi, \u00fcretken sermaye devresi ve meta-sermaye devresi. P\u2013M \u2026 \u00dc \u2026 M\u2019\u2013P\u2019 devresi, para-sermaye devresidir. \u00dc \u2026 M\u2019\u2013P\u2019\u2013M \u2026 \u00dc devresi, \u00fcretken sermaye devresi ve nihayetinde M\u2019\u2013P\u2019\u2013M \u2026 \u00dc \u2026 M\u2019 devresi ise meta-sermaye devresini olu\u015fturur.[11]<\/a><\/p>\n

Rekabet, yo\u011funla\u015fma\u2026 <\/strong><\/p>\n

Sermaye birikimi, geni\u015fleyen yeniden \u00fcretimden ba\u015fka bir \u015fey de\u011fildir. Art\u0131k de\u011ferin \u00fcretildi\u011fi ve bunun bir k\u0131sm\u0131n\u0131n bir sonraki s\u00fcrece aktar\u0131larak her bir seferinde bir \u00f6ncekini a\u015fan niceliksel bir b\u00fcy\u00fcmedir sermaye birikimi. Ama bu nicel birikim, diyalekti\u011fin temel yasas\u0131nda oldu\u011fu gibi, s\u00fcre\u00e7 i\u00e7erisinde nitel bir de\u011fi\u015fime u\u011frar; nicelik niteli\u011fe d\u00f6n\u00fc\u015f\u00fcr. Sermaye birikimi yo\u011funla\u015fmaya yol a\u00e7ar, yo\u011funla\u015fma merkez\u00eele\u015fmeyi \u015fartland\u0131r\u0131r\u2026 Sermayenin merkez\u00eele\u015fmesi ayn\u0131 zamanda bir tekelle\u015fme belirtisidir. Marx, \u201cDo\u011frudan do\u011fruya birikime dayanan ya da (\u2026) onunla ayn\u0131 \u015fey olan bu t\u00fcr yo\u011funla\u015fmay\u0131 karakterize eden iki husus\u201d oldu\u011funu s\u00f6yler. Ona g\u00f6re;<\/p>\n

\u201c[B]irikim, kendisini bir yandan \u00fcretim ara\u00e7lar\u0131n\u0131n ve emek \u00fczerindeki kumanda g\u00fcc\u00fcn\u00fcn gittik\u00e7e artan yo\u011funla\u015fmas\u0131 olarak ortaya koyuyorsa, \u00f6te yandan, \u00e7ok say\u0131daki bireysel sermayelerin birbirlerini geriye itmeleri olarak ortaya koyar.\u201d (2011: 604)<\/p>\n

\u2026merkez\u00eele\u015fme ve tekel <\/strong><\/p>\n

Demek ki birikimin bir ve\u00e7hesi yo\u011funla\u015fma iken di\u011fer ve\u00e7hesi de sermayedarlar aras\u0131nda bir elenme, ay\u0131klanma sava\u015f\u0131d\u0131r; \u00fcstelik bu sava\u015f sermayedarlar\u0131n birbirlerini m\u00fclks\u00fczle\u015ftirmeleri, birbirlerinin hakk\u0131ndan gelmeleriyle sonu\u00e7lan\u0131r.[12]<\/a> Marx, bu gidi\u015fat\u0131n merkez\u00eele\u015fmeye kap\u0131 aralad\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 s\u00f6yler.<\/p>\n

\u201cSermaye bir yerde b\u00fcy\u00fck k\u00fctleler halinde bir elde toplanmaktad\u0131r, \u00e7\u00fcnk\u00fc ba\u015fka yerde pek \u00e7ok elden uzakla\u015fmaktad\u0131r. Bu, birikim ve yo\u011funla\u015fmadan farkl\u0131 olarak, ger\u00e7ek merkez\u00eele\u015fmedir.\u201d (2011: 605)<\/p>\n

Bu s\u00fcre\u00e7te Marx, kapitalist \u00fcretimle birlikte, kredi sistemi<\/strong> denilen yeni bir g\u00fcc\u00fcn olu\u015ftu\u011funun da alt\u0131n\u0131 \u00e7izer.<\/p>\n

\u201c[B]u yeni g\u00fc\u00e7, ilk zamanlar\u0131nda, birikimin m\u00fctevaz\u0131 bir yard\u0131mc\u0131s\u0131 olarak, gizlice i\u015fin i\u00e7ine giren, toplumun y\u00fczeyinde (\u2026) k\u00fctleler h\u00e2linde da\u011f\u0131lm\u0131\u015f bulunan paralar\u0131 g\u00f6r\u00fcnmeyen iplerle (\u2026) kapitalistlerin ellerine \u00e7eken, fakat \u00e7ok ge\u00e7meden rekabet sava\u015f\u0131n\u0131n yeni ve korkun\u00e7 bir silah\u0131 h\u00e2line gelen ve sonunda sermayelerin merkez\u00eele\u015fmesini sa\u011flayan muazzam bir toplumsal mekanizmaya d\u00f6n\u00fc\u015fen kredi sistemidir.\u201d (2011: 605)<\/p>\n

Marx, rekabet ve kredi sisteminin, merkez\u00eele\u015fmenin en g\u00fc\u00e7l\u00fc<\/strong> iki kald\u0131rac\u0131 oldu\u011funun alt\u0131n\u0131 \u00e7izer. Engels, Kapital<\/em>\u2019i d\u00f6rd\u00fcnc\u00fc bas\u0131ma haz\u0131rlarken, merkez\u00eele\u015fme konusunda Marx\u2019\u0131n yazd\u0131\u011f\u0131, \u201c[b]elli bir i\u015f kolunda yat\u0131r\u0131lm\u0131\u015f bulunan b\u00fct\u00fcn sermayeler tek bir bireysel sermaye bi\u00e7iminde eriyip kayna\u015fm\u0131\u015f olsalard\u0131, merkez\u00eele\u015fme bu i\u015f kolunda ula\u015fabilece\u011fi en \u00fcst s\u0131n\u0131ra<\/strong> varm\u0131\u015f olurdu.\u201d (vurgu bizim) c\u00fcmlesine \u015f\u00f6yle bir dipnot d\u00fc\u015fer:<\/p>\n

\u201cHalen, en yeni \u0130ngiliz ve Amerikan \u2018trust<\/em>\u2019leri (tr\u00f6stleri), bu hedefe, hi\u00e7 de\u011filse bir i\u015f kolundaki b\u00fct\u00fcn b\u00fcy\u00fck giri\u015fimleri pratikte tekel olu\u015fturacak bir anonim \u015firket h\u00e2linde birle\u015ftirerek ula\u015fmaya \u00e7al\u0131\u015fmaktad\u0131r.\u201d (2011: 606)<\/p>\n

Burada bu al\u0131nt\u0131lar\u0131 yapmam\u0131n sebebi, kapitalizmdeki nitel<\/strong> de\u011fi\u015fmelerin daha Marx ve Engels hayattayken filizlenmeye ba\u015flad\u0131\u011f\u0131na i\u015faret etmekti. Az \u00f6nceki al\u0131nt\u0131larda Marx, \u201cen \u00fcst s\u0131n\u0131r\u201d; Engels de \u201ctr\u00f6st\u201d ifadesini kullan\u0131yor. Bunlar Lenin\u2019in Emperyalizm<\/em> kitab\u0131nda daha berrak bir bi\u00e7imde a\u00e7\u0131kl\u0131\u011fa kavu\u015fturulacakt\u0131r.<\/p>\n

Emperyalizm: Finans oligar\u015fisinin do\u011fu\u015fu <\/strong><\/p>\n

Emperyalizm, sadece iktisadi de\u011fil, ayn\u0131 zamanda siyasi, askeri ve sosyal boyutlar\u0131 olan \u201c\u00e7ok boyutlu\u201d bir kavram ve genel hatlar\u0131yla kapitalizmin tarihinde nitel bir de\u011fi\u015fimi anlatmak i\u00e7in kullan\u0131lmaktad\u0131r. Bu nitel de\u011fi\u015fim Lenin\u2019den hareketle \u015f\u00f6yle tan\u0131mlanabilir: 1) \u00dcretimde ve sermayede meydana gelen yo\u011funla\u015fma ve tekeller; 2) Banka sermayesi ile s\u0131na\u00ee sermayenin kayna\u015fmas\u0131 ve bunlar\u0131n \u00fczerinde bir finans oligar\u015fisinin kurulmas\u0131<\/strong>; 3) Sermaye ihrac\u0131n\u0131n \u00f6n plana \u00e7\u0131kmas\u0131 vs. Bunlara, d\u00fcnyan\u0131n payla\u015f\u0131lmas\u0131 ve yeniden payla\u015f\u0131lmas\u0131 i\u00e7in b\u00fcy\u00fck gruplar aras\u0131nda h\u00e2l\u00e2<\/strong> s\u00fcrmekte olan k\u0131yas\u0131ya rekabet ve sava\u015flar\u0131 da ekleyebiliriz (Lenin, 1998: 100).<\/p>\n

Emperyalizm, tekeller kapitalizmidir ve Lenin\u2019in de alt\u0131n\u0131 \u00e7izdi\u011fi gibi tekel, \u201ckapitalizmden daha y\u00fcksek bir a\u015famaya ge\u00e7i\u015f\u201d olsa da, bu \u201cy\u00fcksek\u201d a\u015famada kapitalizmin temel hareket yasalar\u0131 i\u015flemeye devam eder. \u00d6rne\u011fin \u00fcretimin yo\u011funla\u015fmas\u0131 ve burjuva anlamda \u201ctoplumsalla\u015fmas\u0131\u201dn\u0131n s\u0131n\u0131rlar\u0131na eri\u015filmi\u015fken m\u00fclkiyetin \u00f6zel karakterini korumas\u0131, \u201ci\u00e7erik\u201d ile \u201cbi\u00e7imin\u201d uyu\u015fmad\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131n en a\u00e7\u0131k g\u00f6stergelerinden biridir. Kapitalizmin emperyalist a\u015famas\u0131nda \u00e7eli\u015fkiler durulmak, t\u00f6rp\u00fclenmek \u015f\u00f6yle dursun artarak devam eder.<\/p>\n

Emperyalizm i\u00e7in kapitalizmin \u201cen y\u00fcksek a\u015famas\u0131\u201d denmesinde \u00fcretimin yo\u011funla\u015fmas\u0131, merkez\u00eele\u015fmesi yani burjuva anlamda \u201ctoplumsalla\u015fmas\u0131\u201dn\u0131n olgunluk derecesine ula\u015fmas\u0131na g\u00f6nderme yap\u0131l\u0131r. Sermayenin yo\u011funla\u015fmas\u0131 ve merkez\u00eele\u015fmesi d\u00fcn[13]<\/a> de devam ediyordu bug\u00fcn de devam ediyor; zira bunun durmas\u0131 i\u00e7in ya rekabetin ya da krizlerin ortadan kalm\u0131\u015f olmas\u0131 gerekirdi. \u015euras\u0131 yeterince a\u00e7\u0131kt\u0131r, geni\u015fleyen yeniden \u00fcretim olmadan sermaye birikemez, sermaye birikemezse yo\u011funla\u015famaz ve yo\u011funla\u015fma olmadan da merkez\u00eele\u015fme ger\u00e7ekle\u015femez. Bunlar aras\u0131nda \u201ci\u00e7sel\u201d bir ba\u011f\u0131nt\u0131 var.<\/p>\n

Kapitalizm 1970\u2019lerin ortalar\u0131nda yap\u0131sal bir krize girdi. Bu kriz bir taraftan neoliberal sald\u0131r\u0131 ile a\u015f\u0131lmaya \u00e7al\u0131\u015f\u0131l\u0131rken di\u011fer taraftan, Sovyetler Birli\u011fi\u2019nin \u00e7\u00f6k\u00fc\u015f\u00fcn\u00fcn bilin\u00e7 d\u00fczeyinde yaratt\u0131\u011f\u0131 \u201csosyalizm \u00e7\u00f6kt\u00fc\u201d alg\u0131s\u0131, s\u0131n\u0131flar aras\u0131ndaki g\u00fc\u00e7 dengesini kapitalizmin lehine olacak \u015fekilde k\u00f6kten bir de\u011fi\u015fikli\u011fe u\u011fratt\u0131. Tarihin makaras\u0131n\u0131 biraz geriye sar\u0131p Avrupa\u2019n\u0131n 1940, 1950 ve 1960\u2019l\u0131 y\u0131llar\u0131na bakt\u0131\u011f\u0131m\u0131zda i\u015f\u00e7i s\u0131n\u0131f\u0131n\u0131n g\u00fc\u00e7l\u00fc muhalefeti ile sistemden muazzam tavizler kopard\u0131\u011f\u0131 ger\u00e7e\u011fiyle kar\u015f\u0131la\u015f\u0131r\u0131z. \u201cRefah devletleri\u201d, e\u011fer b\u00f6yle bir muhalefet bas\u0131nc\u0131 olmasayd\u0131 ku\u015fkusuz olu\u015famayacakt\u0131. Tabii i\u015f\u00e7i s\u0131n\u0131f\u0131n\u0131n bu kemikle\u015fmi\u015f g\u00f6rece refah durumu, g\u00fc\u00e7l\u00fc bir s\u0131n\u0131f sava\u015f\u0131 y\u00fcr\u00fct\u00fclmeksizin k\u0131r\u0131lamazd\u0131. Thatcher\u2019\u0131n \u0130ngiltere\u2019si belki 1980\u2019lerde bunu ba\u015fard\u0131; ancak Fransa, Almanya ve \u0130talya gibi yerlerde i\u015f\u00e7i s\u0131n\u0131f\u0131n\u0131n g\u00fcc\u00fcn\u00fc k\u0131rmak pek kolay olmad\u0131. Dolay\u0131s\u0131yla ortada iki \u00e7\u00f6z\u00fcm vard\u0131; ya kanl\u0131 bir i\u00e7 sava\u015f\u0131n ard\u0131ndan emek g\u00fcc\u00fc maliyetleri, sermayenin hareket yasalar\u0131na ba\u011fl\u0131 olarak, dramatik bir bi\u00e7imde a\u015fa\u011f\u0131ya \u00e7ekilecek ya da hi\u00e7 bu i\u015fe kalk\u0131\u015f\u0131lmadan emek g\u00fcc\u00fc maliyetinin g\u00f6rece daha d\u00fc\u015f\u00fck ve \u00f6rg\u00fctl\u00fcl\u00fck d\u00fczeyinin de c\u0131l\u0131z oldu\u011fu \u201cyeni cennetler\u201de gidilecekti. O cennetler Uzakdo\u011fu Asya, Hindistan, Brezilya gibi \u00fclkelerdi\u2026 1980 sonras\u0131, d\u00fcnyada sanayinin, metropol diye bilinen merkezlerden Asya\u2019ya do\u011fru kayd\u0131r\u0131lmas\u0131n\u0131n alt\u0131nda i\u015fte bu ger\u00e7ek yat\u0131yor. K\u00e2r oran\u0131 d\u00fc\u015fm\u00fc\u015f sekt\u00f6rler peyderpey Asya\u2019ya, G\u00fcney Kore\u2019ye, 1990\u2019dan sonra ise \u00c7in ve Hindistan\u2019a kayd\u0131r\u0131ld\u0131.<\/p>\n

Buradan anla\u015f\u0131l\u0131yor ki, sermayenin \u00fczerinde hareket etti\u011fi zeminin meylini bir \u201ctarihsel arka plan\u201d belirlemektedir. Sermaye bu tarihsel arka plana yaslanarak bir yerden bir yere akmakta, kulvar de\u011fi\u015ftirmekte, buldu\u011fu elveri\u015fli yerde k\u00f6k salmakta ve birikimini sa\u011flamaktad\u0131r.<\/p>\n

Kriz ve finansalla\u015fma <\/strong><\/p>\n

Makalenin bu b\u00f6l\u00fcm\u00fcnde kriz ve finansalla\u015fma konusunda teorik bir \u00e7er\u00e7eve \u00e7izilecek, izleyen b\u00f6l\u00fcmlerde ise krizin tarihsel arka plan\u0131 sergilendikten sonra sistemi 2007-8 \u201c\u00e7\u00f6k\u00fc\u015f\u201d\u00fcne haz\u0131rlayan k\u0131r\u0131lganl\u0131klar anlat\u0131lacakt\u0131r.<\/p>\n

Art\u0131k eme\u011fe duydu\u011fu kurt a\u00e7l\u0131\u011f\u0131 ile sermaye, \u00fcretimi daha fazla mekanize hale getirme e\u011filimi ta\u015f\u0131r. Tabii bu durum rekabetin bas\u0131nc\u0131 alt\u0131nda \u00e7ok daha \u015fiddetli bi\u00e7imde ya\u015fan\u0131r. Bu ikili \u201cdayatma\u201dn\u0131n sermayenin genel hareketi i\u00e7in \u201ck\u00f6stekleyici\u201d bir sonucu vard\u0131r: Rekabetin \u201cbask\u0131\u201ds\u0131 alt\u0131nda artan makinele\u015fmeyle el ele giden daha fazla makinenin daha fazla i\u015f\u00e7iyi d\u0131\u015far\u0131da b\u0131rakmas\u0131 olgusu s\u00fcre\u00e7 i\u00e7erisinde birikimin yava\u015flamas\u0131na ve bu da k\u00e2rl\u0131l\u0131\u011f\u0131n azalmas\u0131na ve nihayetinde kriz durumunun ba\u015f g\u00f6stermesine yol a\u00e7ar. Daha fazla \u00f6l\u00fc eme\u011fin daha fazla canl\u0131 emek ile ikame edilmesi, yat\u0131r\u0131lan sermayeye oranla elde edilen art\u0131k de\u011ferin azalmas\u0131na yol a\u00e7ar. Bu durum ba\u015f g\u00f6sterdi\u011finde kapitalistler yat\u0131r\u0131mdan ka\u00e7maya ba\u015flarlar. Para sermaye ile \u00fcretken sermaye aras\u0131ndaki makas gitgide a\u00e7\u0131l\u0131r. Bu \u015fu demektir: Elinde para olan kapitalist, k\u00e2rl\u0131l\u0131\u011f\u0131n d\u00fc\u015f\u00fck seyretti\u011fi, hatta gitgide azald\u0131\u011f\u0131 bir ortamda paras\u0131n\u0131 makine, te\u00e7hizat ve emek g\u00fcc\u00fcne yat\u0131rmayacakt\u0131r. Para \u00fcretim i\u00e7in harcanmad\u0131\u011f\u0131ndan para sermaye \u00fcretime girip \u00fcretken sermayeye d\u00f6n\u00fc\u015fmez, yani art\u0131k de\u011fer \u00fcretmek i\u00e7in kullan\u0131lamaz. Bir kriz durumudur bu. Kapitalistler k\u00e2r getirisi olmad\u0131\u011f\u0131 d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcncesiyle \u00fcretimden \u00e7ekilip \u00fcretim-d\u0131\u015f\u0131 alanlara kayarlar. Yakla\u015f\u0131k son 30 y\u0131ld\u0131r kapitalistlerin finans alan\u0131na d\u00f6nerek \u201cparadan para kazanma\u201d yoluna girmeleri ve finans alan\u0131n\u0131n hi\u00e7 olmad\u0131\u011f\u0131 kadar cazip hale gelmesinin ard\u0131nda bu ger\u00e7ek vard\u0131r.<\/p>\n

Kapitalist kriz durumunun finans d\u00fcnyas\u0131 ile ilgili y\u00f6n\u00fcn\u00fc ele al\u0131rken birbiriyle ba\u011flant\u0131l\u0131 iki kavrama ba\u015fvuraca\u011f\u0131z; bunlardan biri a\u015f\u0131r\u0131 kredi<\/strong>, di\u011feri ise hayal\u00ee sermaye<\/strong>dir.<\/p>\n

Banka sisteminden elde edilen \u00f6d\u00fcn\u00e7 para ya da menkul k\u0131ymetler arac\u0131l\u0131\u011f\u0131yla elde edilen kaynaklar sayesinde sermayenin yeniden \u00fcretimi, elde edilmi\u015f olan art\u0131k de\u011fer miktar\u0131n\u0131n \u00f6tesine do\u011fru geni\u015flemesini m\u00fcmk\u00fcn k\u0131lar (Savran, 2013: 39). Ama bu geni\u015flemenin belli s\u0131n\u0131rlar\u0131 vard\u0131r ve s\u0131n\u0131rlar \u00fcretim alan\u0131n\u0131n kendi maddi ko\u015fullar\u0131 ile \u00e7izilmi\u015ftir. B\u00fct\u00fcn de\u011ferin ve art\u0131k de\u011ferin kayna\u011f\u0131 \u00fcretimdir. Ama yine de finans d\u00fcnyas\u0131 kendi dinamikleri temelinde s\u00fcrekli olarak kaynak yaratabilme mekanizmalar\u0131na sahiptir. Bu mekanizmalar sayesindedir ki, sermaye birikiminin bir a\u015famas\u0131nda finansal i\u015flemler, \u00fcretim sisteminin kald\u0131rabilece\u011finden daha da \u00f6teye do\u011fru geni\u015flemesini m\u00fcmk\u00fcn k\u0131lar. Marx buna a\u015f\u0131r\u0131 kredi ad\u0131n\u0131 verir. K\u0131saca tan\u0131mlamak gerekirse \u015funu s\u00f6yleyebiliriz; a\u015f\u0131r\u0131 kredi, finans sisteminin, \u00fcretimin olanaklar\u0131n\u0131n \u00f6tesinde geni\u015flemesi durumudur (Savran, 2013: 40).<\/p>\n

Finans alan\u0131n\u0131n krizle ilgili bir di\u011fer boyutu ise \u015fudur: Kriz d\u00f6nemlerinde para sermaye ile \u00fcretken sermaye \u015fiddetli bir bi\u00e7imde birbirinden ayr\u0131l\u0131r. Bu anlamda sermaye devresinin bir boyutunda (P\u2013M \u2026 \u00dc \u2026) \u201ckesinti\u201d ba\u015f g\u00f6sterir. Sermaye \u00fcretim alan\u0131nda \u00fcretilebilen art\u0131k de\u011fere g\u00f6re a\u015f\u0131r\u0131 birikmi\u015ftir. Yat\u0131r\u0131mlar yava\u015flamaya ba\u015flar. \u015eu halde bu durumdan \u00e7\u0131k\u0131\u015f i\u00e7in iki yol vard\u0131r; para sermayenin at\u0131l kalmas\u0131 (\u201cg\u00f6m\u00fcleme\u201d ya da \u201ciddihar\u201d) ya da sermayenin finansal operasyonlara kay\u0131p \u201cparadan para kazanma\u201d yollar\u0131na g\u00f6z\u00fcn\u00fc \u00e7evirmesi. Bu \u015fekilde finansal dola\u015f\u0131m\u0131n b\u00fct\u00fcn alanlar\u0131n\u0131n hacmi b\u00fcy\u00fcr. G\u00fcn\u00fcm\u00fczde oldu\u011fu gibi t\u00fcrevler, hedge fonlar\u0131, menkul k\u0131ymetle\u015ftirme t\u00fcr\u00fcnden yeni finansal dola\u015f\u0131m alanlar\u0131 ortaya \u00e7\u0131kar. Bu \u015fekilde finansal faaliyetler \u00fcretimden kopuk bir \u015fekilde hummal\u0131 bir geli\u015fme g\u00f6sterir. \u0130\u015fte hayal\u00ee sermaye kavram\u0131 burada anlam kazanmaktad\u0131r. Hayal\u00ee sermaye, \u00f6z\u00fcnde \u015fu demektir: Anonim \u015firketlerin hisseleri ve tahvilleri, ilk ortaya \u00e7\u0131kt\u0131klar\u0131nda \u00fcretim ve dola\u015f\u0131m alan\u0131ndaki \u015firketlerin ger\u00e7ek sermayesini temsil ederler. Ancak menkul k\u0131ymetlerin kendileri birer meta haline geldi\u011finde, yani borsada al\u0131m sat\u0131ma konu olmaya ba\u015flad\u0131\u011f\u0131nda, bunlar\u0131n kendi de\u011ferleri (fiyatlar\u0131) olu\u015fmaya ba\u015flar. Bu da bunlar\u0131n de\u011ferlerini \u015firketlerin sermayesinin ger\u00e7ek de\u011ferlerinden ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131zla\u015ft\u0131r\u0131r ve \u201cikinci bir de\u011ferler d\u00fcnyas\u0131\u201d kurar (Savran, 2013: 43). Spek\u00fclasyon i\u00e7in muazzam bir alan\u0131n olu\u015fmas\u0131 anlam\u0131na gelir bu. \u201cT\u00fcrev piyasalar\u0131\u201d bu alan\u0131n daha da geni\u015flemesine olanak sa\u011flar. Art\u0131k sadece \u015firketlerin de\u011feri \u00fczerinde de\u011fil, ulusal borsalar\u0131n ve ekonomilerin birbirine g\u00f6re y\u00fckseli\u015f farklar\u0131 ve gelecekleri \u00fczerine de spek\u00fclasyon yap\u0131labilmektedir. Hayal\u00ee sermaye bu \u015fekilde \u00fcretimin maddi alan\u0131ndan koparak, sermayenin kendisinin s\u00fcr\u00fcncemede olan krizinin belli \u00f6l\u00e7\u00fclerde \u201ca\u015f\u0131lmas\u0131\u201dna (daha do\u011frusu krizin ertelenmesine) neden olur.<\/p>\n

Finans alan\u0131ndaki parasal \u015fi\u015fkinlik \u00fcretim alan\u0131nda ortaya \u00e7\u0131kan k\u00e2rl\u0131l\u0131\u011f\u0131n azalmas\u0131 sorununu k\u00f6k\u00fcnden de\u011fi\u015ftirmez. Krizin daha da derinle\u015fmesi durumu parasal \u015fi\u015fkinlik nedeniyle sadece ertelenir<\/strong>. Ama bu durum sonsuza kadar devam edemez. Nihayetinde finans alan\u0131n\u0131n yapabilece\u011fi \u201cmanevra\u201dlar \u00fcretim alan\u0131ndaki durgunluk ile s\u0131n\u0131rlanm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. \u00dcretimde bir \u201ck\u0131p\u0131rdama\u201d olmazsa finans alan\u0131 il\u00e2nihaye hayat\u0131na devam edemez. G\u00fcn gelir ayaklar\u0131 yerden kesilmi\u015f bir \u015fekilde havada u\u00e7tu\u011funu zanneden \u00fcretim, balonun patlamas\u0131 ile \u015fiddetli bir \u015fekilde yere \u00e7ak\u0131l\u0131r! \u0130\u015fte, 2008\u2019de finansal bir \u00e7\u00f6k\u00fc\u015f ile a\u00e7\u0131\u011fa \u00e7\u0131kan krizin temelinde bu ger\u00e7ek yatmaktad\u0131r.<\/p>\n

G\u00fcn\u00fcm\u00fcz krizinin tarihsel arka plan\u0131 <\/strong><\/p>\n

1929\u2019daki B\u00fcy\u00fck Buhran\u2019\u0131n d\u00fcnya ekonomisinde yaratt\u0131\u011f\u0131 tahribat ve bundan \u00e7\u0131k\u0131\u015f yollar\u0131 b\u00fct\u00fcn d\u00fcnya halklar\u0131 i\u00e7in tam bir felaket olmu\u015ftu. Krizin faturas\u0131, gerek Avrupa\u2019da gerekse de ABD\u2019de i\u015f\u00e7i s\u0131n\u0131f\u0131na \u00f6detilmeye \u00e7al\u0131\u015f\u0131ld\u0131. Avrupa\u2019da fa\u015fizmin ve diktat\u00f6rl\u00fck rejimlerinin y\u00fckseli\u015fi ve ard\u0131ndan d\u00fcnyay\u0131 ikinci kez payla\u015fma sava\u015flar\u0131n\u0131n g\u00fcndeme geli\u015fi Avrupa\u2019n\u0131n yerle bir olu\u015funa, Yahudi soyk\u0131r\u0131m\u0131na, Hiro\u015fima ve Nagasaki\u2019ye ve buna benzer daha pek \u00e7ok olaya yol a\u00e7m\u0131\u015ft\u0131. T\u00fcm bu olanlar\u0131 kapitalist \u00fcretim \u00e7evriminde 1914-39 y\u0131llar\u0131 aras\u0131nda ya\u015fanan istikrarl\u0131 d\u00fc\u015f\u00fc\u015fle ba\u011flant\u0131l\u0131 olarak ele almak gerekir.<\/p>\n

Fa\u015fizmin ve \u0130kinci D\u00fcnya Sava\u015f\u0131\u2019n\u0131n i\u015f\u00e7i s\u0131n\u0131f\u0131n\u0131 zay\u0131flatmas\u0131, atomize etmesi k\u00e2r oranlar\u0131nda b\u00fcy\u00fck bir art\u0131\u015f\u0131 olanakl\u0131 k\u0131larak sermaye birikimine bir canl\u0131l\u0131k kazand\u0131rd\u0131. Ayr\u0131ca sava\u015fla birlikte sermayenin de\u011fersizle\u015fmesi de ya\u015fanm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Sonras\u0131nda emperyalist \u00fclkelerde uluslararas\u0131 i\u015fb\u00f6l\u00fcm\u00fcn\u00fcn yo\u011funla\u015fmas\u0131 ve yar\u0131-s\u00f6m\u00fcrgelerde ise sanayile\u015fmenin ba\u015flamas\u0131 ile d\u00fcnya pazar\u0131 \u00f6nemli \u00f6l\u00e7\u00fcde geni\u015flemi\u015ftir. \u00dcretken sermayenin uluslararas\u0131la\u015fmas\u0131n\u0131n kayda de\u011fer bir \u00f6l\u00e7ekte ortaya \u00e7\u0131kt\u0131\u011f\u0131 d\u00f6nem bu d\u00f6neme rastlar. Bu geli\u015fme, beraberinde meta-sermayenin ve para-sermayenin hareketine de bir h\u0131z vermi\u015f ve kapitalist \u00fcretim ili\u015fkilerinin t\u00fcm d\u00fcnyaya yay\u0131lmas\u0131n\u0131n zeminini d\u00f6\u015femi\u015ftir (\u00d6zt\u00fcrk, 2006: 274). Bu d\u00f6nem, kapitalizmin sava\u015f sonras\u0131nda i\u00e7ine girdi\u011fi uzun geni\u015fleme d\u00f6nemi diye adland\u0131r\u0131l\u0131r. Burjuva ekonomistlerin \u201cAlt\u0131n \u00c7a\u011f\u201d olarak adland\u0131rd\u0131klar\u0131 bu d\u00f6nem, 1973\u2019teki \u201cpetrol krizi\u201dne kadar s\u00fcrer. Ad\u0131na \u201cpetrol krizi\u201d denen bu kriz kapitalizmin tarihi i\u00e7inde uzun aral\u0131klarla ger\u00e7ekle\u015fen 1870\u2019lerdeki, 1930\u2019lardaki gibi uzun ve depresif karakterli bir krize i\u015faret eder.<\/p>\n

\"\"\u015eekil 6, 1949-2001 y\u0131llar\u0131 aras\u0131nda ABD, Japonya ve Almanya sanayilerinin net k\u00e2r oranlar\u0131n\u0131 g\u00f6stermektedir.[14]<\/a><\/p>\n

\u015eekilden de g\u00f6r\u00fcld\u00fc\u011f\u00fc gibi 1970\u2019lerden itibaren her \u00fc\u00e7 \u00fclke i\u00e7in de k\u00e2r oranlar\u0131nda bir d\u00fc\u015f\u00fc\u015f g\u00f6zlenmektedir. \u015eekil 7\u2019de g\u00f6r\u00fclen bir di\u011fer grafik ise yine ABD, Japonya ve Almanya i\u00e7in \u00f6zel sekt\u00f6r net k\u00e2r oranlar\u0131n\u0131 g\u00f6stermektedir.[15]<\/a><\/p>\n

\"\"\u015eekil 7\u2019de \u00f6ne \u00e7\u0131kan \u015fey, \u00f6zel sekt\u00f6r k\u00e2rlar\u0131n\u0131n \u00e7ok daha d\u00fc\u015f\u00fck bir seviyede olmas\u0131d\u0131r.<\/p>\n

Her iki veri de bize, d\u00fcnyan\u0131n motor ekonomilerinin daha 1970\u2019lerden itibaren bir durgunlu\u011fa girmi\u015f olduklar\u0131n\u0131 g\u00f6stermektedir.<\/p>\n

1970\u2019lerle beraber ba\u015flayan kriz, 1980\u2019lerden g\u00fcn\u00fcm\u00fcze de\u011fin uygulamaya konulan ve bug\u00fcnk\u00fc isyan ve protesto hareketlerinin tetikleyicisi olan bir dizi uygulamalarla, i\u015f\u00e7i s\u0131n\u0131f\u0131na sava\u015f sonras\u0131 verilen \u00f6d\u00fcnlerin geri al\u0131nmas\u0131 s\u00fcrecini ba\u015flatm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. S\u0131n\u0131flar aras\u0131ndaki gerilim, sermayenin kar\u015f\u0131 sald\u0131r\u0131ya ge\u00e7mesi ile de\u011fi\u015fikli\u011fe u\u011frayacak, i\u015f\u00e7i s\u0131n\u0131f\u0131 da mevzilerini korumak ve yer yer de bunlar\u0131 kaybederek bu s\u00fcreci genel olarak bir \u201cgeri \u00e7ekilme\u201d d\u00f6nemi olarak ya\u015fayacakt\u0131r. Bu d\u00f6nem, d\u00fcnyada ve tabii T\u00fcrkiye\u2019de i\u015f\u00e7i s\u0131n\u0131f\u0131na kar\u015f\u0131 son derece sert tedbirlerin uyguland\u0131\u011f\u0131 bir d\u00f6nemdir. \u015eili\u2019de Pinochet, \u0130ngiltere\u2019de Thatcher, ABD\u2019de Reagan ve ayn\u0131 neoliberal politikalar\u0131n T\u00fcrkiye\u2019deki mimar\u0131 \u00d6zal bu d\u00f6nemin \u00f6ne \u00e7\u0131kan sadece birka\u00e7 \u201cfig\u00fcr\u201d\u00fcd\u00fcr. \u00d6zelle\u015ftirmeler; e\u011fitimin, sa\u011fl\u0131\u011f\u0131n, kamu hizmetlerinin piyasala\u015ft\u0131r\u0131lmas\u0131 gerek d\u00fcnyada gerekse de T\u00fcrkiye\u2019de bu d\u00f6neme damgas\u0131n\u0131 vuran ve bug\u00fcn de devam eden uygulamalard\u0131r. K\u0131saca neoliberalizm dedikleri \u015fey asl\u0131nda, sermayenin son derece azg\u0131n bir \u015fekilde i\u015f\u00e7i s\u0131n\u0131f\u0131na kar\u015f\u0131 t\u00fcm d\u00fcnyada sald\u0131r\u0131ya ge\u00e7mesinden ba\u015fka bir \u015fey de\u011fildir!<\/p>\n

Sistemi bug\u00fcnk\u00fc krize s\u00fcr\u00fckleyen temel dinamikler \u00fczerinden meseleyi tart\u0131\u015ft\u0131\u011f\u0131m\u0131zda kar\u015f\u0131m\u0131za \u00e7\u0131kan, sermaye birikiminin yava\u015flamas\u0131<\/strong> olgusudur. Bunun nedeni ise 1970\u2019lerin ortalar\u0131nda k\u00e2r oranlar\u0131n\u0131n d\u00fc\u015fmesine ba\u011fl\u0131 olarak ya\u015fanan durgunluktur.<\/p>\n

Krizle birlikte uzun bir durgunluk d\u00f6nemine giren kapitalizm, kendi krizini a\u015fmak i\u00e7in \u00e7e\u015fitli stratejiler izlemektedir. Sermayenin bu uzun krize yan\u0131t\u0131 neoliberalizm olmu\u015ftur. Neoliberalizm, sermayenin 1970\u2019li y\u0131llar\u0131n ortalar\u0131nda ba\u015flayan d\u00fcnya \u00e7ap\u0131ndaki uzun krizini a\u015fabilmek amac\u0131yla i\u015f\u00e7i s\u0131n\u0131f\u0131na bir sald\u0131r\u0131s\u0131d\u0131r. Y\u00f6ntemi ise i\u015f\u00e7i s\u0131n\u0131f\u0131n\u0131 b\u00f6lmek ve de\u011fi\u015fik b\u00f6l\u00fcklerini rekabet i\u00e7ine sokmakt\u0131r (Savran, 2013: 90). Ama neoliberalizmin uluslararas\u0131 alana yay\u0131lmas\u0131 gerekiyordu. Bu ise 1989\u2019da Berlin Duvar\u0131\u2019n\u0131n y\u0131k\u0131lmas\u0131, Do\u011fu Avrupa\u2019da, SSCB\u2019de ve \u00c7in\u2019de bir dizi \u00e7\u00f6z\u00fclmenin ya\u015fanmas\u0131 ve kapitalizmin restorasyonu s\u00fcre\u00e7leri ile m\u00fcmk\u00fcn olabildi. Neoliberalizme gelen karde\u015fin ismi \u201ck\u00fcreselcilik\u201d idi. K\u00fcreselcilik b\u00fct\u00fcn uluslardan i\u015f\u00e7ilerin ve emek\u00e7ilerin birbirleriyle rekabetini k\u0131\u015fk\u0131rtarak uluslararas\u0131 planda sermayenin \u00e7\u0131karlar\u0131 a\u00e7\u0131s\u0131ndan en uygun ko\u015fullar\u0131 yaratmay\u0131 hedefleyen bir sald\u0131r\u0131 stratejisidir (Savran, 2013: 83). K\u00fcreselcilik, sermayenin d\u00fcnya \u00e7ap\u0131nda i\u015f\u00e7i s\u0131n\u0131f\u0131na kar\u015f\u0131 bir sald\u0131r\u0131s\u0131d\u0131r; ama bu s\u0131n\u0131f taarruzu ideolojik bir k\u0131l\u0131fla sunulmaktayd\u0131: \u201ck\u00fcreselle\u015fme\u201d. Art\u0131k ulus devletin sonu gelmi\u015ftir, sermaye \u201cyersiz-yurtsuzla\u015fm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r\u201d vs. G\u00fcn\u00fcm\u00fczde reva\u00e7ta olan \u201ck\u00fcreselle\u015fme\u201d a\u00e7\u0131klamas\u0131 \u015f\u00f6yledir: K\u00fcreselle\u015fme, dijital teknolojinin geli\u015fmesi sonucunda hayat\u0131m\u0131za \u201cka\u00e7\u0131n\u0131lmaz\u201d olarak girmi\u015ftir; dolay\u0131s\u0131yla bu ger\u00e7ekli\u011fe direnmek beyhudedir vs. Konuya kapitalizmin uzun krizi perspektifinden bakanlar i\u00e7in durum \u00e7ok farkl\u0131d\u0131r. \u201cK\u00fcreselle\u015fme\u201d bu perspektifle, \u201c[k]apitalizmin krizine kar\u015f\u0131 geli\u015ftirilmi\u015f, i\u015f\u00e7i s\u0131n\u0131f\u0131n\u0131 zay\u0131flatmak ve teslim almak amac\u0131yla benimsenmi\u015f bir uluslararas\u0131 stratejinin ideolojik \u00e7er\u00e7evesidir\u201d (Savran, 2013: 91).<\/p>\n

\u201cK\u00fcreselcilik\u201d ve sonras\u0131nda SSCB\u2019nin da\u011f\u0131lmas\u0131yla birlikte ideolojik planda sunulan \u201ck\u00fcreselle\u015fme\u201d ve tabii esnekle\u015ftirme, kurals\u0131zla\u015ft\u0131rma ve yal\u0131n \u00fcretim\u2026 T\u00fcm bunlar asl\u0131nda kapitalizmin, kendi uzun ve derin krizini a\u015fmas\u0131na y\u00f6nelik olarak uygulamaya konan stratejilerdir. Sermayenin d\u00fcnya \u00e7ap\u0131nda i\u015f\u00e7i s\u0131n\u0131f\u0131na kar\u015f\u0131 taarruza ge\u00e7mesini e\u011fer tek bir kelime alt\u0131nda \u00f6zetleyecek olursak buna k\u0131saca neoliberalizm<\/strong> diyebiliriz.<\/p>\n

1970\u2019lerin ortas\u0131ndan bu yana, yava\u015flayan sermaye birikiminin bas\u0131nc\u0131 alt\u0131nda k\u00e2r getirisi olmayaca\u011f\u0131 d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcncesiyle kapitalistler yat\u0131r\u0131mlardan uzakla\u015f\u0131p \u00fcretim-d\u0131\u015f\u0131 sekt\u00f6rlere kayd\u0131lar. Birikim temelde, b\u00fct\u00fcn bir emek s\u00fcreci i\u00e7erisinde, gerekli eme\u011fin \u00f6tesinde \u00fcretilen art\u0131k de\u011fer ve bu art\u0131k de\u011ferin de bir k\u0131sm\u0131n\u0131n bir sonraki \u00fcretim \u00e7evrimine yat\u0131r\u0131lmas\u0131 ile ger\u00e7ekle\u015fir. Buna \u00fcretimin geni\u015fleyen \u00f6l\u00e7ekte s\u00fcrmesi denir. Ama kapitalist ekonomi \u201cpetrol krizi\u201d sonras\u0131nda \u00f6yle bir d\u00f6neme girdi ki, birikimini, \u201cgeni\u015fleyen yeniden \u00fcretim\u201dden \u00e7ok, var olana \u201cel koyarak\u201d sa\u011flayan; gerekirse cebir ve \u015fiddet kullanarak i\u015fleri m\u00fcmk\u00fcn oldu\u011funca d\u00fc\u015f\u00fck maliyetle (hatta kimi zaman \u201cs\u0131f\u0131r\u201d maliyetle) kotarmaya \u00e7al\u0131\u015fan bir hale b\u00fcr\u00fcnd\u00fc. Bu da ister istemez b\u00fcy\u00fcmeyi yava\u015flatan bir duruma yol a\u00e7t\u0131 (Harvey, 2008). \u015euras\u0131 bir ger\u00e7ek ki, \u201ckapitalist bir ekonomide yat\u0131r\u0131mlar, dolay\u0131s\u0131yla emek tahsisi, g\u00f6reli olarak \u00fcretim d\u0131\u015f\u0131 (yani ticaret ve finansal) sekt\u00f6rlere daha \u00e7ok y\u00f6nelirse b\u00fcy\u00fcme yava\u015flar. Hatta durur ve ekonomi krize, depresyona girer\u201d (Tonak, 2010: 145).<\/p>\n

1990\u2019larda b\u00fcy\u00fck kapitalist ekonomilerde (\u00f6rne\u011fin ABD\u2019de) g\u00f6r\u00fclen \u201cekonomik canlanma\u201d, faiz oranlar\u0131n\u0131n dramatik bir \u015fekilde a\u015fa\u011f\u0131 \u00e7ekilerek t\u00fcketicilere kredi verilmesi (bor\u00e7land\u0131rma) suretiyle ger\u00e7ekle\u015fen bir \u201ccanlanma\u201dyd\u0131. Ama bundan da \u00f6nemlisi bu canlanma, asl\u0131nda, neoliberal sald\u0131r\u0131 denen \u015fey ile i\u015f\u00e7ilerdeki g\u00f6reli yoksulla\u015fma, yani reel \u00fccretlerdeki art\u0131\u015flar\u0131n i\u015f\u00e7ilerin \u00fcretkenliklerindeki art\u0131\u015ftan geride kalmas\u0131, yani sat\u0131n alma g\u00fcc\u00fcndeki g\u00f6reli d\u00fc\u015f\u00fc\u015f ve i\u015f\u00e7i s\u0131n\u0131f\u0131n\u0131n artan s\u00f6m\u00fcr\u00fcs\u00fc ile sa\u011fland\u0131. Sat\u0131n alma g\u00fcc\u00fcn\u00fcn d\u00fc\u015ft\u00fc\u011f\u00fc bir ortamda -hele de kredi almak son derece kolayla\u015fm\u0131\u015fken- bor\u00e7lanma cazip hale geldi ve bu da hane halk\u0131 bor\u00e7lar\u0131nda bir patlamaya yol a\u00e7t\u0131. Kapitalist sistem bu \u015fekilde bor\u00e7la d\u00f6nen bir ekonomik canlanma ya\u015fad\u0131, ta ki bug\u00fcnk\u00fc \u00e7\u00f6k\u00fc\u015fe kadar.<\/p>\n

\"\"\u015eekil 8\u2019deki grafik ABD\u2019de faiz oran\u0131n\u0131 g\u00f6stermektedir. 1947 ile 1981 y\u0131llar\u0131 aras\u0131nda faiz oran\u0131 24 kat artm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r; y\u00fczde 0,59\u2019dan y\u00fczde 14,03\u2019e \u00e7\u0131km\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. 1981\u2019den sonraki evrede ise faiz oran\u0131 y\u00fczde 14,03\u2019ten 2009\u2019da y\u00fczde 0,16\u2019ya kadar gerilemi\u015ftir. Bu durum, bor\u00e7lanman\u0131n son derece ucuzlamas\u0131 anlam\u0131na gelmektedir.[16]<\/a><\/p>\n

Sistem ni\u00e7in \u201ck\u0131r\u0131lgan\u201dla\u015ft\u0131? <\/strong><\/p>\n

Sistemin k\u0131r\u0131lganla\u015fmas\u0131n\u0131n ard\u0131nda iki t\u00fcr neden sayabiliriz; bunlardan biri krizin tarihsel arka plan\u0131na konu olan durumla ili\u015fkili. 1970\u2019lerin ortalar\u0131ndan sonra, ama daha \u00e7ok da 1980\u2019lerle birlikte sermayenin neoliberal sald\u0131r\u0131s\u0131, i\u015f\u00e7i s\u0131n\u0131f\u0131n\u0131n \u0130kinci D\u00fcnya Sava\u015f\u0131 sonras\u0131nda kopard\u0131\u011f\u0131 tavizlerin geri al\u0131nmas\u0131 s\u00fcrecini ba\u015flatt\u0131. Ama i\u015f\u00e7i s\u0131n\u0131f\u0131n\u0131n sermayenin bu taarruzuna cevab\u0131 c\u0131l\u0131z kalm\u0131\u015f ve s\u00fcre\u00e7 b\u00fcy\u00fck \u00f6l\u00e7\u00fcde \u201cgeri \u00e7ekilmeler\u201de sahne olmu\u015ftur. Bunu yukar\u0131da a\u00e7\u0131klad\u0131k.<\/p>\n

\"\"ABD \u00f6zelinde konuya bak\u0131ld\u0131\u011f\u0131nda kar\u015f\u0131m\u0131zda duran ger\u00e7eklik \u015fudur: 1980\u2019lerden 2000\u2019li y\u0131llar\u0131n sonuna kadar ABD\u2019de saatlik reel \u00fccretler ile \u00fcretkenlik aras\u0131ndaki ili\u015fkiye bakt\u0131\u011f\u0131m\u0131zda, s\u00f6z konusu d\u00f6nemde eme\u011fin d\u00f6rt bir koldan planl\u0131 bir sald\u0131r\u0131ya maruz b\u0131rak\u0131lmas\u0131 ile reel \u00fccretler ve \u00fcretkenlik aras\u0131ndaki makas hi\u00e7 olmad\u0131\u011f\u0131 \u00f6l\u00e7\u00fcde a\u00e7\u0131lm\u0131\u015f bulunmaktad\u0131r. \u015eekil 9 bu durumu \u00e7arp\u0131c\u0131 bir \u015fekilde g\u00f6zler \u00f6n\u00fcne sermektedir.[17]<\/a><\/p>\n

Bu durum elbette efektif talebi d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcren ve realizasyon sorunlar\u0131n\u0131 daha da \u201criskli\u201d hale getiren bir duruma kap\u0131 aralam\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Ama bu efektif talep bo\u015flu\u011fu kredi mekanizmalar\u0131 ile kapat\u0131lmaya \u00e7al\u0131\u015f\u0131ld\u0131\/\u00e7al\u0131\u015f\u0131l\u0131yor. Harvey\u2019in 2007-8 krizine dair s\u00f6ylediklerini burada anmak yerinde olacakt\u0131r:<\/p>\n

\u201cEsas a\u011f\u0131rl\u0131k merkezi kredi sisteminin ve devlet ile finans aras\u0131ndaki ba\u011f\u0131n teknolojik ve organizasyonel bi\u00e7imlerinde yat\u0131yor olsa da, temeldeki sorun kapitalistlerin i\u015f\u00e7i s\u0131n\u0131f\u0131 kar\u015f\u0131s\u0131nda a\u015f\u0131r\u0131 g\u00fc\u00e7lenmesi ve bunun sonucunda \u00fccretlerin bast\u0131r\u0131lmas\u0131, bunun da efektif talebe ili\u015fkin sorunlara yol a\u00e7mas\u0131, bu sorunlar\u0131n \u00fcst\u00fcn\u00fcn d\u00fcnyan\u0131n bir yan\u0131nda kredi taraf\u0131ndan ate\u015flenen bir t\u00fcketim \u00e7\u0131lg\u0131nl\u0131\u011f\u0131 ve bir ba\u015fka yan\u0131nda ise \u00fcretimin yeni \u00fcr\u00fcn hatlar\u0131nda gere\u011finden fazla h\u0131zl\u0131 geni\u015flemesi taraf\u0131ndan \u00f6rt\u00fclmesidir.\u201d (Harvey, 2012: 126)<\/p>\n

Tabii s\u00fcrece bir de sermaye cephesinden bakmak gerekir. D\u00fc\u015f\u00fck k\u00e2rl\u0131l\u0131\u011f\u0131n bas\u0131nc\u0131 alt\u0131nda sermaye cephesi de yeni yat\u0131r\u0131mlar yapmak yerine spek\u00fclatif yollardan para kazanma yollar\u0131na ba\u015fvurdu. M\u00fclks\u00fczle\u015ftirme yoluyla birikim (ya da \u201cel koyarak birikim\u201d) bunun bir arac\u0131d\u0131r (Harvey, 2008). Marx Kapital<\/em>\u2019in ikinci cildinde \u015f\u00f6yle der:<\/p>\n

\u201c\u00dcretim s\u00fcreci yaln\u0131zca ka\u00e7\u0131n\u0131lamayan bir ara halka, para kazanmak isteniyorsa katlan\u0131lmas\u0131 gereken bir dert olarak g\u00f6r\u00fcn\u00fcr. {Bu y\u00fczden, kapitalist \u00fcretim tarz\u0131n\u0131n ge\u00e7erli oldu\u011fu uluslar\u0131n hepsi, d\u00f6nemsel olarak, para kazanmay\u0131 araya \u00fcretim s\u00fcrecini sokmadan ger\u00e7ekle\u015ftirme h\u0131rslar\u0131na kapt\u0131r\u0131rlar kendilerini.}\u201d (2012: 61)<\/p>\n

Kapitalizmin bug\u00fcnk\u00fc finansalla\u015fm\u0131\u015f boyutunun \u201canahtar\u0131\u201d asl\u0131nda tam da buradaki ana e\u011filimde yat\u0131yor!<\/p>\n

\u015eimdi bir b\u00fct\u00fcn olarak sermaye devresini tekrardan hat\u0131rlayal\u0131m. Devrenin form\u00fcl\u00fc \u015fu \u015fekildeydi: P\u2013M \u2026 \u00dc \u2026 M\u2019\u2013P\u2019. 1970\u2019lerden bu yana \u00fclkesel ve b\u00f6lgesel d\u00fczeylerde ya\u015fanan kapitalizmin krizleri alt\u0131nda sermayenin bu genel devresinin ge\u00e7mi\u015fe k\u0131yasla hi\u00e7 olmad\u0131\u011f\u0131 kadar \u201ck\u0131r\u0131lgan\u201dla\u015ft\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 s\u00f6yleyebiliriz. Zaten bu nedenledir ki, \u201crisk\u201d fakt\u00f6r\u00fcn\u00fcn artm\u0131\u015f olmas\u0131 riskin metala\u015fmas\u0131 olarak \u201ct\u00fcrev \u00fcr\u00fcnler\u201di ortaya \u00e7\u0131karm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. T\u00fcrev \u00fcr\u00fcnler asl\u0131nda bir risk y\u00f6netim modeli olarak ortaya \u00e7\u0131km\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Bu model ile gelece\u011fin belirsiz oldu\u011fu bir ortamda meta fiyatlar\u0131ndaki dalgalanmalardan etkilenmemek ve metan\u0131n gelecekteki fiyat\u0131n\u0131 sabitlemek ama\u00e7lanmaktad\u0131r.<\/p>\n

K\u00fcresel ekonomideki risk fakt\u00f6r\u00fcn\u00fcn geli\u015fmesi \u00f6zellikle Bretton Woods sisteminin \u00e7\u00f6z\u00fclmesiyle birlikte ger\u00e7ekle\u015fti. \u015eirketler d\u00fcnyas\u0131ndaki risk y\u00f6netim tekniklerinin geli\u015fmesi, esas\u0131nda kapitalist \u00fcretim tarz\u0131n\u0131n i\u00e7sel olarak ta\u015f\u0131d\u0131\u011f\u0131 kriz potansiyellerinin engellenmesine y\u00f6neliktir. Kapital<\/em>\u2019de a\u00e7\u0131kland\u0131\u011f\u0131 gibi, sermaye devreleri ve bu devrelerin her bir a\u015famas\u0131, ger\u00e7ekle\u015fememe riskini her zaman i\u00e7inde ta\u015f\u0131r. Dolay\u0131s\u0131yla kapitalist \u00f6rg\u00fctlenme, bu risklerin bertaraf edilmesi ya da en az\u0131ndan azalt\u0131lmas\u0131 veya yer de\u011fi\u015ftirilmesi \u00fczerine kurulur.<\/p>\n

T\u00fcrev ara\u00e7lar\u0131n geli\u015fiminin sonucunda kredi t\u00fcrev \u00fcr\u00fcnlerinin ortaya \u00e7\u0131kmas\u0131, finansal sistem a\u00e7\u0131s\u0131ndan b\u00fcy\u00fck bir s\u0131\u00e7rama yaratm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Kredinin batma riskinin ortadan kalkmas\u0131 ya da en az\u0131ndan \u00fc\u00e7\u00fcnc\u00fc bir tarafa transfer edilebilir hale gelmesi, finansal kurumlar a\u00e7\u0131s\u0131ndan, normalde alacaklar\u0131ndan \u00e7ok daha fazla riski \u00e7ok daha kolay bir \u015fekilde almalar\u0131n\u0131 m\u00fcmk\u00fcn k\u0131lm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. K\u0131saca yeni geli\u015ftirilen kredi t\u00fcrev \u00fcr\u00fcnleri sayesinde risk transferinin m\u00fcmk\u00fcn olmas\u0131, daha \u00f6nce sisteme i\u00e7erilmemi\u015f olan yoksullar\u0131n sisteme entegrasyonunu m\u00fcmk\u00fcn k\u0131lm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r (Ak\u00e7ay ve G\u00fcngen, 2014: 32-36). Bu da sistemi k\u0131r\u0131lgan bir hale getirmi\u015ftir.<\/p>\n

Sonun ba\u015flang\u0131c\u0131\u2026 <\/strong><\/p>\n

Yaz\u0131m\u0131z\u0131n bu son b\u00f6l\u00fcm\u00fcnde ABD \u00f6zelinde konut sekt\u00f6r\u00fc ve finans alan\u0131ndaki krizin geli\u015fimini sergilemeye \u00e7al\u0131\u015faca\u011f\u0131z.<\/p>\n

ABD, B\u00fcy\u00fck Buhran\u2019dan sonra 40 y\u0131l s\u00fcren uzun bir b\u00fcy\u00fcme ya\u015fam\u0131\u015ft\u0131. Ekonominin s\u0131k\u0131 bir \u015fekilde reg\u00fcle edildi\u011fi bir d\u00f6nemdi bu d\u00f6nem. 1980\u2019lere gelindi\u011finde finans sekt\u00f6r\u00fcnde b\u00fcy\u00fck bir patlama ya\u015fand\u0131. Yat\u0131r\u0131m bankalar\u0131 kamuya a\u00e7\u0131ld\u0131. Bu d\u00f6nemi takiben Wall Street\u2019teki ki\u015filer muazzam zenginle\u015fmeye ba\u015flad\u0131lar. Reagan y\u00f6netimi; ekonomistler, lobiciler taraf\u0131ndan s\u0131k\u0131 bir \u015fekilde desteklendi. Reagan, finans piyasalar\u0131n\u0131n \u00f6n\u00fcn\u00fc a\u00e7an 30 y\u0131ll\u0131k finansal dereg\u00fclasyonu ba\u015flatm\u0131\u015ft\u0131. Bu d\u00f6nem neoliberalizm diye adland\u0131r\u0131lan, k\u00e2ra susam\u0131\u015f sermayenin ba\u015fka bir sald\u0131r\u0131 hamlesinin \u00f6n ko\u015fullar\u0131n\u0131n geli\u015fmeye ba\u015flad\u0131\u011f\u0131 d\u00f6neme tekab\u00fcl eder. Piyasalar\u0131n finansal dereg\u00fclasyonu, i\u015f\u00e7i s\u0131n\u0131f\u0131n\u0131n sava\u015f sonras\u0131nda elde etti\u011fi kazan\u0131mlar\u0131na y\u00f6nelik bir dizi sald\u0131r\u0131n\u0131n fitilini ate\u015fleyen d\u00f6nemin de ba\u015flang\u0131c\u0131n\u0131 olu\u015fturuyordu. Dereg\u00fclasyon ile dev bankalar b\u00fcy\u00fcd\u00fck\u00e7e b\u00fcy\u00fcd\u00fc, \u00f6yle ki kendilerinden kaynaklanacak en ufak bir \u201c\u00e7uvallama\u201d b\u00fct\u00fcn bir sistemi tehdit edebilirdi. Pe\u015fi s\u0131ra gelen ABD ba\u015fkanlar\u0131 bu s\u00fcreci frenlemek bir yana daha da k\u00f6r\u00fcklediler.<\/p>\n

\u0130lgin\u00e7tir, \u00fcnl\u00fc spek\u00fclat\u00f6r George Soros, dereg\u00fclasyonun ekonomide yaratabilece\u011fi potansiyel tehlikelere \u015f\u00f6yle i\u015faret etmektedir:<\/p>\n

\u201cPiyasalar do\u011falar\u0131 gere\u011fi istikrars\u0131zd\u0131r ya da en az\u0131ndan istikrars\u0131zl\u0131\u011fa meyillidir. Mesela bunu \u015f\u00f6yle bir metaforla a\u00e7\u0131klamaya \u00e7al\u0131\u015fal\u0131m. \u00d6rne\u011fin petrol tankerleri\u2026 \u00c7ok b\u00fcy\u00fckt\u00fcrler, ama geminin petrol ta\u015f\u0131nan b\u00f6l\u00fcmlerini bariyerlerle b\u00f6lerek geminin petrol y\u00fcz\u00fcnden dengesini kaybetmesini \u00f6nleyebilirsiniz. (\u2026) B\u00fcy\u00fck Buhran\u2019dan sonra bu denetimler s\u0131k\u0131 bir \u015fekilde uyguland\u0131. Fakat dereg\u00fclasyonlarla bu bariyerler kald\u0131rd\u0131 ve sistem bu \u015fekilde daha da riskli bir hale getirildi.\u201d[18]<\/a><\/p>\n

1990\u2019lardan ba\u015flayarak dereg\u00fclasyon ve teknolojideki yeniliklerle beraber, ad\u0131na \u201ct\u00fcrev \u00fcr\u00fcnler\u201d denen \u00fcr\u00fcnlerle bankac\u0131lar neredeyse her \u015fey \u00fcst\u00fcne \u201ckumar\u201d oynad\u0131lar. 1990\u2019lar\u0131n sonlar\u0131na do\u011fru kurals\u0131zla\u015ft\u0131r\u0131lm\u0131\u015f piyasalardaki t\u00fcrev \u00fcr\u00fcnlerinin de\u011feri 15 trilyon dolar\u0131 buluyordu.<\/p>\n

Gelelim mortgage kredilerine ve bunun patlamas\u0131na.[19]<\/a> \u201cDot-com\u201d krizi sonras\u0131nda ekonominin durgunlu\u011fa girmesi, Federal Reserve\u2019\u00fcn o d\u00f6nemki ba\u015fkan\u0131 Alan Greenspan\u2019i faiz oranlar\u0131n\u0131 d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcrmeye zorlar ve faiz oranlar\u0131 % 1\u2019e kadar d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcr\u00fcl\u00fcr. Bu durumda bor\u00e7lanma gerek bankalar gerekse de hane halklar\u0131 i\u00e7in son derece kolayla\u015fm\u0131\u015f olur. Ard\u0131ndan mortgage kredileri \u00fczerinden ABD i\u015f\u00e7i s\u0131n\u0131f\u0131 -ve bununla beraber s\u0131n\u0131f\u0131n geni\u015f yoksul kesimleri de- sisteme i\u00e7erilmeye ba\u015flan\u0131r. Lapavitsas bu ger\u00e7eklikten hareket ederek ABD krizinin a\u00e7\u0131\u011fa \u00e7\u0131k\u0131\u015f\u0131n\u0131 a\u00e7\u0131klamaya \u00e7al\u0131\u015f\u0131r. Lapavitsas\u2019a g\u00f6re, tarihte e\u015fi g\u00f6r\u00fclmeyen bir \u015fekilde kriz, yoksullar\u0131n bor\u00e7lar\u0131n\u0131 \u00f6deyememesiyle ba\u015flam\u0131\u015f ve finansal sistemde geli\u015ftirilen yeni bir uygulama olan menkul k\u0131ymetle\u015ftirme ile de t\u00fcm d\u00fcnyaya yay\u0131lm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r (Ak\u00e7ay ve G\u00fcngen, 2014: 55). \u0130\u015f\u00e7i s\u0131n\u0131f\u0131n\u0131n ve yoksullar\u0131n ulusal \u00f6l\u00e7ekte bor\u00e7 verilebilir fonlar sayesinde sisteme i\u00e7erilmesi i\u00e7sel finansal derinle\u015fme<\/strong>; bu ayn\u0131 e\u011filimin d\u00fcnya \u00f6l\u00e7e\u011finde ger\u00e7ekle\u015fmesine ise uluslararas\u0131 finansal b\u00fct\u00fcnle\u015fme<\/strong> denir. Bu iki e\u011filimin birlikte ya\u015fanm\u0131\u015f olmas\u0131 finansal i\u015flemlerin ger\u00e7ekle\u015fmesini kolayla\u015ft\u0131rd\u0131\u011f\u0131 gibi sistemin k\u0131r\u0131lganl\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 ve krizlerin bula\u015f\u0131c\u0131l\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 da bir o kadar art\u0131rm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r (Ak\u00e7ay, 2014: 28).<\/p>\n

Eski sistemde, ev sahibi her ay ald\u0131\u011f\u0131 ev kredisini \u00f6dedi\u011finde para haliyle onu kimden ald\u0131ysa oraya giderdi. Yeni sistemde, konut ipotek anla\u015fmas\u0131 bankayla bor\u00e7lu aras\u0131ndaki \u201cikili ili\u015fki\u201dnin \u00f6tesine giden bir menkul de\u011fer haline d\u00f6n\u00fc\u015ft\u00fcr\u00fcld\u00fc. Banka ile m\u00fc\u015fteri aras\u0131nda yap\u0131lan ikili anla\u015fma bir belge haline getirildikten sonra bir menkul de\u011fer olarak, yani hisse senedi gibi, bor\u00e7 senedi gibi menkul de\u011fer olarak \u201cyat\u0131r\u0131mc\u0131\u201d bankalara sat\u0131ld\u0131. Ve bu binlerce mortgage bor\u00e7 senetleri di\u011fer senetlerle birlikte (ta\u015f\u0131t kredisi, e\u011fitim kredisi, kredi kart\u0131 bor\u00e7lar\u0131 vs.) birle\u015ftirilip bunlardan karma\u015f\u0131k t\u00fcrev \u00fcr\u00fcnler olu\u015fturuldu. Sonras\u0131nda yat\u0131r\u0131m bankalar\u0131 bu t\u00fcrev \u00fcr\u00fcnleri ba\u015fka yat\u0131r\u0131mc\u0131lara satt\u0131. \u015eimdi ev sahibi, ald\u0131\u011f\u0131 krediyi geri \u00f6dedi\u011finde \u00f6denen bu para t\u00fcm d\u00fcnya \u00fczerinde yat\u0131r\u0131mc\u0131lara gitmi\u015f oluyor. Bu yat\u0131r\u0131m bankalar\u0131, derecelendirme kurulu\u015flar\u0131na ellerindeki bu t\u00fcrev \u00fcr\u00fcnlerini de\u011ferlendirmeleri i\u00e7in para veriyorlar. Derecelendirme kurulu\u015flar\u0131 da bunlar\u0131n \u00e7o\u011funa en y\u00fcksek notlar\u0131 (AAA<\/strong>) veriyor. Bu olabilecek en y\u00fcksek yat\u0131r\u0131m puan\u0131d\u0131r.[20]<\/a><\/p>\n

Kolay para pe\u015finde ko\u015fan yat\u0131r\u0131mc\u0131lar mortgage senetlerine daha fazla yat\u0131r\u0131m yapmak istiyorlard\u0131. Piyasay\u0131 daha ak\u0131\u015fkan h\u00e2le getirmek \u00f6ncelikle bunu daha k\u0131r\u0131lgan h\u00e2le getirmeyi gerektiriyordu. Yani bu mortgage kredileri, ad\u0131na sub-prime (standart-alt\u0131) denen; pe\u015fin \u00f6demesiz, kefilsiz vs. \u015fekilleri alt\u0131nda hane halklar\u0131na tekrardan sunuldu. Sistem, h\u0131z\u0131n\u0131 yava\u015f yava\u015f art\u0131ran bir araba gibi, kar\u015f\u0131s\u0131na \u00e7\u0131kacak keskin viraj\u0131 nas\u0131l d\u00f6nerim diye d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcnmeden alm\u0131\u015f ba\u015f\u0131n\u0131 gidiyordu. Do\u011frusu yat\u0131r\u0131m bankalar\u0131, ad\u0131na sub-prime denen bu en riskli kredileri tercih ettiler, \u00e7\u00fcnk\u00fc b\u00f6ylelikle y\u00fcksek k\u00e2rlar elde ediyorlard\u0131. Bu do\u011fal olarak b\u00fcy\u00fck bir kredi balonunun olu\u015fmas\u0131na yol a\u00e7t\u0131. Mortgage kredilerinin geri \u00f6demelerinde bir aksama olunca, s\u00f6zle\u015fme gere\u011fi ipotekli evlere el konuldu ve sat\u0131\u015fa \u00e7\u0131kar\u0131ld\u0131. Bu, genelle\u015fmi\u015f bir durum al\u0131nca piyasadaki konjonkt\u00fcr gere\u011fi ev fiyatlar\u0131 d\u00fc\u015fmeye ba\u015flad\u0131. Bor\u00e7lar \u00f6denemedi ve h\u00e2lihaz\u0131rda konut kredilerini \u00f6demekte olan aileler de d\u00fc\u015fen konut fiyatlar\u0131 nedeniyle bu \u00f6demeleri yapman\u0131n gereksiz oldu\u011funu anlay\u0131nca kimilerinin evlerine el konuldu; kimileri de evlerini sat\u0131\u015fa sundu. Patlamaya ramak kalm\u0131\u015f bir sistemin g\u00f6sterdi\u011fi belirtilerdi bunlar. \u0130\u015fte \u201c\u00e7\u00f6k\u00fc\u015f\u201d bu ko\u015fullarda ya\u015fand\u0131.<\/p>\n

Yakla\u015f\u0131k 7 y\u0131l \u00f6nce patlak veren k\u00fcresel krizin derinle\u015fmi\u015f bir evresinden ge\u00e7iyoruz bug\u00fcn. Hem ya\u015fad\u0131\u011f\u0131m\u0131z d\u00fcnyay\u0131 anlaman\u0131n hem de buna g\u00f6re bir siyaset \u00fcretmenin yolu, hi\u00e7 ku\u015fku yok ki, ekonomiyi ve bir b\u00fct\u00fcn olarak hayat\u0131 anlamaktan ge\u00e7iyor. E\u011fer bu yaz\u0131 b\u00f6ylesi bir eksikli\u011fi doldurmu\u015fsa g\u00f6revini yerine getirmi\u015f olacakt\u0131r.<\/p>\n

Dipnotlar<\/strong><\/p>\n

[1]<\/a> G\u00f6rselin al\u0131nd\u0131\u011f\u0131 kaynak: H\u00fcrriyet<\/em>, 24 A\u011fustos 2015, (Eri\u015fim tarihi: 23 Eyl\u00fcl 2015), link: http:\/\/goo.gl\/JAf8hp.<\/p>\n

[2]<\/a> \u201c\u00c7in \u0130\u00e7in Kriz Yeni Ba\u015fl\u0131yor\u201d, Kriz Notlar\u0131<\/em>, 23 Eyl\u00fcl 2015, link: http:\/\/goo.gl\/EW60XA.<\/p>\n

[3]<\/a> Bkz. Savran (2013: 139).<\/p>\n

[4]<\/a> Bkz. Savran (2013: 139).<\/p>\n

[5]<\/a> Grafi\u011fin al\u0131nd\u0131\u011f\u0131 kaynak: World Economic Situation and\u00a0Prospects 2015<\/em>; United Nations New York, 2015, s. 3, Eri\u015fim: http:\/\/goo.gl\/ttT55s.<\/p>\n

[6]<\/a> Grafi\u011fin al\u0131nd\u0131\u011f\u0131 kaynak: World Economic Situation and\u00a0Prospects 2015<\/em>; United Nations New York, 2015, s. 24, Eri\u015fim: http:\/\/goo.gl\/ttT55s.<\/p>\n

[7]<\/a> Global Employment Trends 2014: Risk of a jobless recovery?<\/em>, International Labour Office, Geneva: ILO, 2014.<\/p>\n

[8]<\/a> World Economic Situation and\u00a0Prospects 2015<\/em>; United Nations New York, 2015, s. 14, Eri\u015fim: http:\/\/goo.gl\/ttT55s.<\/p>\n

[9]<\/a> The<\/em> Economist<\/em>, 18 A\u011fustos 2015, (Eri\u015fim tarihi: 23 Eyl\u00fcl 2015), link: http:\/\/goo.gl\/IlZQ8A.<\/p>\n

[10]<\/a> Bkz. Marx (2011: 613).<\/p>\n

[11]<\/a> Ayr\u0131ca bkz. Desai (1974: ii).<\/p>\n

[12]<\/a> \u201cRekabet, her zaman, sermayeleri k\u0131smen galibin eline ge\u00e7en, k\u0131smen yok olan, daha k\u00fc\u00e7\u00fck boydaki bir\u00e7ok kapitalistin ortadan kalkmas\u0131yla son bulur.\u201d Marx (2011: 605).<\/p>\n

[13]<\/a> \u0130kinci emperyalist payla\u015f\u0131m sava\u015f\u0131 sonras\u0131 sermayenin uluslararas\u0131 yo\u011funla\u015fmas\u0131 ve merkez\u00eele\u015fmesinin Marksist bir tahlili i\u00e7in Mandel\u2019in Avrupa Amerika\u2019ya Kar\u015f\u0131<\/em> eserine bak\u0131labilir (Mandel, 1974).<\/p>\n

[14]<\/a> Bkz. Brenner (2006: 7).<\/p>\n

[15]<\/a> Bkz. Brenner (2006: 8).<\/p>\n

[16]<\/a> Bkz. Shaikh (2011), link: http:\/\/goo.gl\/lPLhUd.<\/p>\n

[17]<\/a> Bkz. Shaikh (2011), link: http:\/\/goo.gl\/lPLhUd.<\/p>\n

[18]<\/a> Aktar\u0131m: Inside Job<\/em> belgeselinden.<\/p>\n

[19]<\/a> Buradaki anlat\u0131m\u0131 The Crisis of Credit<\/em> adl\u0131 animasyon \u00fczerinden yola \u00e7\u0131karak olu\u015fturmaya \u00e7al\u0131\u015ft\u0131m. Bkz. http:\/\/crisisofcredit.com.<\/p>\n

[20]<\/a> Bear Stearns, iflas bayra\u011f\u0131n\u0131 \u00e7ekmeden yakla\u015f\u0131k bir ay \u00f6nce A2<\/strong>; Lehman Brothers, iflas\u0131n\u0131n ba\u015flad\u0131\u011f\u0131 g\u00fcnlerde A2<\/strong>; AIG, kendisine kurtarma simidinin at\u0131ld\u0131\u011f\u0131 g\u00fcnlerde AA<\/strong>; Fannie Mae ve Freddie Mac, kurtar\u0131ld\u0131klar\u0131 zaman AAA<\/strong> gibi \u00e7ok y\u00fcksek oranlarda derecelendirilmi\u015flerdi. Benzer \u015fekilde Citigroup, Merrill Lynch gibi kurulu\u015flar da y\u00fcksek oranlarda derecelendirilmi\u015fti!<\/p>\n

Kaynak\u00e7a<\/strong><\/p>\n

– Ak\u00e7ay, \u00dcmit ve G\u00fcngen, Ali R\u0131za. 2014. Finansalla\u015fma, Bor\u00e7 Krizi ve \u00c7\u00f6k\u00fc\u015f<\/em>, Ankara: NotaBene Yay\u0131nlar\u0131.<\/p>\n

– Ak\u00e7ay, \u00dcmit. 2014. \u201cAvrupa\u2019n\u0131n Krizi ve T\u00fcrkiye\u201d, D\u0130SK-AR<\/em> dergisi, say\u0131: 3.<\/p>\n

– Brenner, Robert. 2006. The Economics of Global Turbulence: The Advanced Capitalist Economies from Long Boom to Long Downturn, 1945-2005<\/em>, London ve New York: Verso.<\/p>\n

– Desai, Meghnad. 1974. Marxian Economic Theory<\/em>, London: Gray-Mills Publishing.<\/p>\n

– Harvey, David. 2008. Yeni Emperyalizm<\/em>, \u00c7ev. H\u00fcr G\u00fcld\u00fc, \u0130stanbul: Everest Yay\u0131nlar\u0131.<\/p>\n

– Harvey, David. 2012. Sermaye Muammas\u0131: Kapitalizmin Krizleri<\/em>, \u00c7ev. Sungur Savran, \u0130stanbul: SEL Yay\u0131nc\u0131l\u0131k.<\/p>\n

– Lenin, V.I. 1998. Emperyalizm: Kapitalizmin En Y\u00fcksek A\u015famas\u0131<\/em>, \u00c7ev. Cemal S\u00fcreya, Ankara: Sol Yay\u0131nlar\u0131.<\/p>\n

– Mandel, Ernest. 1974. Avrupa Amerika\u2019ya Kar\u015f\u0131<\/em>, \u00c7ev. Mustafa Da\u011flar, \u0130stanbul: K\u00f6z Yay\u0131nlar\u0131.<\/p>\n

– Marx, Karl. 2011. Kapital<\/em>, Cilt I, \u00c7ev. Mehmet Selik \u2013 Nail Satl\u0131gan, \u0130stanbul: Yordam Kitap.<\/p>\n

– Marx, Karl. 2012. Kapital<\/em>, Cilt II, \u00c7ev. Mehmet Selik, \u0130stanbul: Yordam Kitap.<\/p>\n

– \u00d6zt\u00fcrk, \u00d6zg\u00fcr. 2006. \u201cEmperyalizm Kuramlar\u0131 ve Sermayenin Uluslararas\u0131la\u015fmas\u0131\u201d, Praksis<\/em> dergisi, say\u0131: 15.<\/p>\n

– Savran, Sungur. 2013. \u00dc\u00e7\u00fcnc\u00fc B\u00fcy\u00fck Depresyon: Kapitalizmin Alacakaranl\u0131\u011f\u0131<\/em>, \u0130stanbul: Yordam Kitap.<\/p>\n

– Shaikh, Anwar. 2011. \u201cThe First Great Depression of the 21st Century\u201d, Socialist Register: The Crisis This Time<\/em>, Vol. 47. T\u00fcrk\u00e7esi: \u201cY\u00fczy\u0131l\u0131n \u0130lk B\u00fcy\u00fck Buhran\u0131\u201d, Socialist Register: Bu Defaki Kriz<\/em>, \u00c7ev. Umut Haskan, \u0130stanbul: Yordam Kitap, 2012.<\/p>\n

– Tonak, E. Ahmet. 2010. Batan Piyasalar! 21. Y\u00fczy\u0131l\u0131n \u0130lk Buhran\u0131<\/em>, \u0130stanbul: K\u0131rm\u0131z\u0131 Yay\u0131nlar\u0131.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

7 sene \u00f6nce, 15 Eyl\u00fcl 2008\u2019de ABD yat\u0131r\u0131m bankas\u0131 Lehman Brothers\u2019\u0131n \u00e7\u00f6k\u00fc\u015f\u00fc k\u00fcresel krizin fitilini ate\u015fleyen bir \u201colay\u201d olmu\u015ftu. O tarihten bug\u00fcne kriz co\u011frafi yay\u0131lmas\u0131n\u0131 tamamlamakla beraber, durulmak \u015f\u00f6yle dursun derinle\u015fmeye ba\u015flad\u0131. 7 y\u0131l \u00f6nce patlak veren k\u00fcresel krizin derinle\u015fmi\u015f bir evresinden ge\u00e7iyoruz bug\u00fcn. Hem ya\u015fad\u0131\u011f\u0131m\u0131z d\u00fcnyay\u0131 anlaman\u0131n hem de buna g\u00f6re bir siyaset \u00fcretmenin […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":526,"featured_media":16946,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[178,28],"tags":[2018,278,2017,433,1565,2019],"class_list":["post-16935","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-141-sayi","category-sosyal-bilimler","tag-borsa","tag-ekonomi","tag-finansallasma","tag-kapitalizm","tag-kriz","tag-kuresel-kriz"],"acf":[],"aioseo_notices":[],"aioseo_head":"\n\t\t\n\t\n\t\n\t\n\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t